Part 6: Life After Khomeini

Then right before the death of Khomeini, a series of changes of the Constitution were proposed to make the Islamic Republic run more efficiently and effectively. Given the conflict between Khamenei and Mousavi, the post of Prime Minister would be eliminated leaving only the President as the Head of Government. The Expediency Council would become an official body in the Islamic Republic to better mediate in conflicts between the elected Majlis and the unelected clerical Guardian Council. In addition, the requirements to be Supreme Leader would be loosened to allow any cleric to hold the position whereas before only top ranking Grand-Ayatollahs could qualify. Khomeini gave his approval to changes and they were passed in a referendum held during the same time as the July 1989 presidential election.

The change in requirements to be Supreme Leader was important because Khomeini was on his deathbed in 1989 and his previous heir apparent was no longer going to be the next leader of the Islamic Republic. Grand-Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri had been one of Khomeini’s most loyal followers during the revolution and was one of the strongest proponents of including Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution. However, Montazeri became increasingly disillusioned with the authoritarian nature of the regime and what he felt was the misuse of the Velayat-e Faqih as a mandate for dictatorship. Once designated to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader; Montazeri would fall out of favor with his onetime teacher and mentor.

The reign of terror was winding down due to the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the frail health of Khomeini. Just before the end of the war, Iraq launched a military campaign with the help of the MKO. The regime took the opportunity for one last round of executions of political prisoners in particular those associated with the MKO and thousands would be executed right before the end of the war. Although the executions were secret at the time, details would slowly emerge in the coming months about the scope of the executions.

Montazeri dared to speak out by publishing an open letter in which he criticized Khomeini for the executions and denial of basic rights to the people. Montazeri’s willingness to speak out demonstrated that the regime could no longer operate in the same manner as the initial revolutionary moment or during the war. Prominent members of the regime were no longer willing to look the other way at regime’s abuses since the external threat of a war with Iraq no longer justified it. As a result, the reign of terror would come to an end and the regime no longer had free reign to execute whomever it wanted. Yet the timing of Montazeri’s criticisms just a few months before the death of Khomeini meant that he no longer was going to be the next Supreme Leader as Khomeini bluntly told him in a letter, “you are no longer eligible to succeed me as the legitimate leader of the state”.

On June 3, 1989 Khomeini died at the age of 86 and the Islamic Republic of Iran had lost the man who had led its tumultuous first 10 years. With the new loosened requirements to be Supreme Leader, President Khamenei was elevated to the highest position in the Islamic Republic. As Supreme Leader, Khamenei went about adapting the regime to both its new constitutional changes and life after its charismatic first leader who had maintained order over the last 10 years.

Khamenei was only a mid level cleric and he was picked over many other higher ranking clerics. This lack of clerical standing would continue to haunt Khamenei with lingering questions about his qualifications to be Supreme Leader and his absolute power in the regime. Questions would also arise about the entire institution of the Supreme Leader since it was becoming an increasingly political and not religious role.

The new Supreme Leader and the newly elected President Rafsanjani began to further centralize power within the regime. Rafsanjani was primarily concerned about the economic direction of the country and set about rebuilding the economy in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. He advocated free market reforms to spur economic growth after 8 years of heavy state control and rationing during the war. Although the state would have less control over the economy, Rafsanjani personally would have more power over the economy and other aspects of the state than his predecessors as president. The elimination of the post of Prime Minister and Khamenei’s relatively weak position as Supreme Leader compared to Khomeini meant that Rafsanjani would have tremendous influence in the regime.

In addition to Rafsanjani’s growing power, Khamenei and other conservatives argued that the recent constitutional changes were passed to centralize the command structure of the regime. In order to increase efficiency, the Supreme Leader should increase his ability to govern in any manner he felt appropriate. According to this logic, the constitutional reforms made efficiency the top priority of the state necessitating a strong Supreme Leader. Popular will and human rights become secondary concerns behind the effectiveness of the state in implementing its policies.

The radicals were opposed to this authoritarian view on the constitutional changes and started to increasingly challenge the ruling conservative faction of the regime. As Mousavi argued shortly after leaving office in 1989 "Imam [Khomeini] demanded ‘centralization in executive affairs,’ not the centralization of executive matter in the hands of one person who manipulates all resources, responsibilities, and finances without any accountability. The meaning of centralization is not that people in charge are not accountable, and may disregard opposition to their policies. If we give authority to anybody in government, we need to expect dissent and disagreement. Every person, including the [Supreme] Leader, in the government must be accountable to the law and act within the frame of the constitution".

Thus just a few months after the death of Khomeini, his disciples were already disagreeing about what he intended the Islamic Republic to look like.

At this point, Mousavi was out of office and the radicals had fallen out of favor with the conservatives running the regime. Mousavi’s old adversary Khamenei was now in charge of the Islamic Republic and Rafsanjani was the powerful new president. The radicals opposed both Khamenei’s desire to create a more authoritarian regime and Rafsanjani’s free market reforms, but now they had little power in the regime.

They were entering the political wilderness and would have to figure out a way to once again come to power in the Islamic Republic. As for Mousavi himself, he would leave politics dissatisfied with the direction of the regime, “in the last days of Imam Khomeini's life, I foresaw major changes in the government and predicted that I won't be there anymore”. Mousavi would reenter politics 20 years later only to have his prediction once again proven right.

Poem For Iran

الان و فردا

الان
ایران
سیاه
است

الان
ایران
ساکت
است

الان
من
مریض
هستم

فردا
ایران
سبز
است

فردا
ایران
اذاد
است

فردا
من
سالم
هستم

Now and Tomorrow

Now
Iran
Is
Black

Now
Iran
Is
Quite

Now
I
Am
Sick

Tomorrow
Iran
Is
Green

Tomorrow
Iran
Is
Free

Tomorrow
I
Am
Healthy

Part 5: Khomeini's Followers Begin to Split

The end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988 and the death of Supreme Leader Khomeini in June 1989 marked the end of an era for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the one year period between August 1988 and August 1989, these two events and a series of other major changes led to a period of transition for the regime. The pillars that maintained the initial revolutionary moment in Iran were gone and the Islamic Republic would have to adapt to a new order. Those who now were in charge of the country in the wake of these changes would begin a process of normalization to maintain the Islamic Republic in this new environment.

In the wake of this transition, the reign of terror in Iran would finally come to an end and a period of moderation would take place for roughly the next decade. What Brinton calls the thermidor period occurs in all post-revolutionary societies when the initial zeal for the revolution wanes within the regime and the overall population. “This tends to occur shortly after the death or ousting of the charismatic figure, though signs can often be seen during the leader's reign”.

In the Iranian case, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of the revolution’s charismatic leader Khomeini meant that the thermidor would begin in the Islamic Republic around 1989. In this period of moderation, the regime allowed greater political freedoms leading to the creation of a vibrant civil society in Iran. This environment allowed liberal Islamist intellectuals to question the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and even the concept of the Islamic Republic.

As the reign of terror ended in Iran and a moderate political environment developed, the coalition of Islamists forged to create the Islamic Republic would begin to collapse. Khomeini’s disciples disagreed over the fundamental nature of the regime and fiercely competed for power in the years to come. In this competition, some of the most loyal followers of Khomeini started to question the very foundations of the Islamic Republic. Ultimately, these liberal Islamists would join together to create the reform movement aimed at transforming the regime from within.

At the same time, those who wanted to maintain a more authoritarian regime would initially have the upper hand in this transition period. While they had to allow limited liberalization, conservatives in the regime were still able to keep a tight control on power. This dominance was challenged in the late 1990s as reformists would triumph at the ballot box in three straight elections. In response, the thermidor period would come to an end and conservatives would take steps to reassert their control of the regime.

Even before Khomeini’s death, internal conflict had started within the different Islamist factions of the regime. The most prominent manifestation of this conflict was between then President Ali Khamenei and then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. The two would clash repeatedly over various state policies making governing difficult in the Islamic Republic.
At this early stage, it was becoming apparent that two different camps were emerging within the regime embodied in the rivalry between the two men. Due to his tremendous standing, Khomeini was the final arbiter of all conflicts and would often side with Mousavi over Khamenei. Even though Khomeini attempted to balance the different factions of the regime against each other, division was brewing within the regime and it would only grow after his death.

Mousavi and his faction of the regime represented the leftist and liberal elements within the Islamic movement who wanted greater revolutionary change. They “advocated the cause of the poor, believed in the export of the revolution, maintained a more tolerant view on sociocultural policies, and supported state-sponsored redistributive and egalitarian policies”. Given their desire for a more substantive economic and social change after the revolution, they were dubbed “the radicals” by those who were weary of their intentions in transforming Iran.

However, they made up a significant portion of the Islamist movement within the regime and had strong backing among both the intellectuals and lower classes in the country. Mousavi was appointed Prime Minister to appease this faction within the regime and would serve for eight years managing the nation during the war with Iraq. Over time these radicals began to shift their attention to the authoritarian nature of the regime since they believed in represented an abandonment of the original revolutionary ideas.

Khamenei and the conservative faction of the regime represented a coalition between those who believed in free market economics and a more authoritarian view on government. They did not believe there was a major economic component to the revolution and were against redistribution of wealth to the masses. The conservatives were also weary of the public participation in the governing process and argued for greater clerical control of the government through Velayat-e Faqih. “This faction enjoyed the backing of the traditional Iranian bourgeoisie, the merchants of the bazaar, as well as the ultra-orthodox clergy and the highly religious segments of Iranian society”.

Khamenei and the other conservatives within the regime had to compete with Mousavi as Prime Minister and a significant block of radicals in the Majlis for Khomeini’s favor. Even with their significant differences, the continued internal threat posed by the MKO and the external threat of Iraq caused these two factions to cooperate in order to maintain the Islamic Republic. As the 1980s wore on and the threat to the regime diminished, early cracks in the coalition were already becoming visible.

One of the first major signs of the of the internal conflict was the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party established in 1979 as an umbrella organization for Islamists loyal to Khomeini. By 1987, the different factions within the regime meant that it could no longer operate coherently as the official political party of the Islamist coalition. It became obvious that new political parties would have to emerge in order to represent the increasingly diverse views within the regime.

Khameini and Speaker of the Majlis Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani sent a letter to Khomeini requesting that the Islamic Republican Party be split up. Khomeini gave his approval and the dominant political party in Iran which had helped to create and maintain the Islamic Republic no longer existed. In the coming years, it would be replaced with numerous other political parties each with its own unique vision for the Islamic Republic causing further division within the regime.

The next group to fracture within the regime was the Society of Militant Clergy (SMC) which had been created before the revolution in 1977. It was made up of clerics loyal to Khomeini and who rejected the complacent attitude of others clerics who did not actively oppose the Shah. The divisions apparent in other parts of the regime were also evident in the clergy, and a new clerical organization would be born more aligned with the radicals.

A group of clerics who would later become leading figures in the reform movement including future president Mohammad Khatami and future speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi sent an open letter to Khomeini in 1988 requesting the creation of a new clerical organization.

They reiterated their concern that a split in the SMC might appear a sign of ‘trouble for the revolution.’ They assured the Supreme Leader that they have considered ‘all possible compromises with other respected ruhaniyun [clergy].’ ‘But,’ the letter explained… ‘we have decided to form a new association in the service of the Islamic revolution.’ They called the new organization Majma’-e Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez, or the Association of Militant Clerics (AMC).

People Support Dastgheyb

Despite the shameful attack on the Mosque of Ayatollah Dastgheyb, the people of Shiraz pledge their support for him.

Part 4: The Revolution Falls Apart

The constitution was immediately put to the test as conflict between the different political factions was spiraling towards violence. Islamists loyal to Khomeini became alarmed at Bazargan’s attempts to repair relations with the United States since they believed America was plotting to undermine the revolution. They believed that the American embassy in particular was a “Nest of Spies” and on November, 4 1979 a group of revolutionary students would seize the embassy and a number of its employees. Bazargan demanded that Khomeini force the students to release the employees, but Khomeini refused setting off the Iranian hostage crisis.

Bazargan and his provisional government resigned in protest, and the brief rule of moderates after the revolution would come to an end. In the aftermath, revolutionaries loyal to Khomeini would seize control of the government and would begin a reign of terror. While these Islamists were divided among themselves into leftist, liberal, and conservative camps, they were united in their fear that the revolution would fail and the Islamic Republic would collapse. At this point, their main goal was simply to establish the new regime and would endorse the reign the terror as means to that end. The Islamists loyal to Khomeini began to further consolidate power by eliminating liberal, communist, and even moderate Islamist opposition to their dominance of power in Iran.

Then in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran sparking a bloody eight year long conflict. As a result, the prospect of Saddam Hussein taking over the country provided further glue for the Islamist coalition. Moreover, the government intensified its crackdown against all opposition under the banner of national security since the war was “not just to repel invaders but also to cleanse Iran of all secular tendencies”.

The regime rounded up political opponents executing many and throwing many more in prison. These opponents included members of Bazargan’s provisional government such as former deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir-Entezam who would be jailed indefinitely and former Minister of Health Kazem Sami who would later be killed (New York Times 1988, np). Thousands more would flee the country as the reign of terror would engulf Iran.

The purge of opposition to the regime left only Islamists loyal to Khomeini participating within the political system and in positions of power. When the first president of the Islamic Republic Abulhassan Banisadr started to exert independence from Khomeini, he was be branded as a threat to the Islamic republic. He too was swept up in the purges and was forced to flee the country in 1981 as Khomeini loyalists solidified their hold on power. This early precedent made it clear that the elected branches of the government would have to take a back seat to power of the Supreme Leader.

The purges would extend to nearly all aspects of Iranian society as the regime sought to secure its hold on power. In this effort, the regime would launch a process dubbed the Iranian Cultural Revolution to transform Iran’s academic environment. The universities had always been a hotbed of leftist activity, and they provided the last stronghold for opponents of the regime. During the course of the Iranian Cultural Revolution, professors would be purged from their positions and course materials would be rewritten to fall in line with Islamic principles. The end goal was to turn the universities into a loyal component of the Islamic movement, but it would also wreak havoc on Iran’s academia for years to come.

Groups such as the Marxist inspired People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO) began a campaign of bombings and assassinations in response to the government’s own violence. They killed many of the top figures in the regime especially during a devastating bombing that killed both President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. This new internal threat only caused the regime to intensify its reign of terror and confirmed Islamist fears that there was a constant threat to the revolution. In this chaotic situation, Khomeini’s previous statements of an open society free from force were quickly replaced by the political reality of an increasingly authoritarian regime.

At this early state, liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini were willing to overlook gross violations of human rights and the constitution. During the reign of terror, there was a high likelihood of being swept up in the purges if you criticized the regime’s actions. Moreover, real threats to the Islamic Republic existed in the form of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the MKO which in the mind of liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini temporarily justified violations of democratic principles. If the very existence of the Islamic Republic was in danger, then the goal of a truly democratic Iran could be deferred until the regime itself could be secured.

Even though certain Islamists temporarily ignored the violations and intrinsic contradictions of the constitution, the potential for conflict was simply deferred to a later date. “This approach proved successful in the first period of postrevolutionary state-building, but it also laid the foundation for future contentions over the legitimacy of the regime from within”. As the initial revolutionary moment passed, some Islamists who supported Khomeini’s vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran while he was alive would start to question the power of the state once he was gone.

With external and internal threats diminishing, the reign of terror would come to a close with a period moderation during the 1990s. Parts of the Islamist coalition that created the Islamic Republic would become increasingly frustrated at its ideological rigid vision of an authoritarian state. Division was brewing from within the Islamic Republic over the legacy of the revolution and the nature of the new regime. This division was only going to grow over time as Khomeini’s disciples would fight amongst themselves for power as the revolutionary regime would now enter a stage of transition.

VIdeo of Attack on Karroui's House

Ayatollah Dastgheib Mosque Attacked

Here is the story:

Several sources report that clashes between plainclothes forces and students of Ayatollah Dastgheib were reported at Qoba mosque in Shiraz. As Ayatollah Dastgheib predicted, following the Qods Day rally, plainclothes forces were led to Qoba mosque. The people at Qoba mosque contacted the police and told them of the planned attack. The police declined to send forces to the potential clash scene and instead only set fences around the mosque.

The plainclothes forces, who reportedly number between 200 and 300, broke down the fences, broke the mosque door, and attacked Ayatollah Dastgheib’s students.

People who were inside the mosque were unable to leave, and since there was no access to medical supplies, they began to help the injured students by tending to their wounds with materials they had available.

The number of people injured in the attack is currently unknown. Ayatollah Datsgheib’s supporters living outside Shiraz have no other way of supporting him but to spread the news.

Qods Day Protests Largely Absent

With Government forces putting great pressure on Mehdi Karroubi, large scale protests against the regime like last year have laregly been missing. Here is one report:

Pro-government militiamen attacked the home of an Iranian opposition leader with homemade bombs and beat one of his bodyguards unconscious, an opposition website reported, in an apparent attempt to keep him from attending a key rally on Friday.

Mahdi Karroubi's guards had to fire gunshots in the air to clear crowds that broke down the door of his home on Thursday night after days of gatherings outside, said the Sahamnews website, which supports Iran's pro-reform movement.

The report said the attackers were members of the plainclothes Basij militia, which led the crackdown on protests that swept the country in response to allegations of fraud in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's June 2009 re-election. Karroubi was one of the pro-reform candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad.

The brazen assault on Karroubi's doorstep suggests the Basij and other government security forces have increasingly turned their attention to pinpoint intimidation of opposition leaders after crackdowns derailed street protests.

Karroubi has remained the most public dissenter — with his car being the target of pro-government mobs several times. But authorities also have directed pressure on Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi and former President Mohammad Khatami.

The opposition has not held any street demonstrations since February and canceled plans for a rally on the anniversary of the election.

Crowds also encircled Karroubi's residence for several hours Friday as Iranians filled Tehran's streets for the annual state-sponsored rally known as Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day.

The government uses the occasion as an anti-Israel outpouring and to show its support for the Palestinians. But last year, Karroubi and other opposition leaders marked the day by gathering tens of thousands of their own supporters into the streets, and violent clashes broke out with security forces.

Crowds of hard-line protesters have gathered at the gate of Karroubi's home for several days, apparently because they believed he would try to attend the rally again this year, though none of the opposition leaders has called for demonstrations.

Karroubi's son, Hossein, told The Associated Press Friday that dozens of hard-liners had targeted the leader's home for several hours on Friday but they later dispersed.

President Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, addressed the Tehran rally, saying Israel and its supporters are too weak to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. No violence was reported at the event. Israel, the United States and other nations believe Iran intends to develop atomic weapons under the cover of its civil nuclear power program. Iran denies that, saying its nuclear work is only for peaceful purposes.

The president also dismissed the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks held in Washington this week, saying "the fate of Palestine will be decided in Palestine and through resistance and not in Washington." Iran supports the Palestinian militant group Hamas.

Gatherings for Quds Day were also held in other cities around the country.

Karroubi, a cleric, and Mousavi were the two pro-reform candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad in 2009. Mousavi claims he won the election but that it was stolen from him through massive fraud.

On Friday, Mousavi condemned the attack on Karroubi's home, saying it proved the government's "enmity against Israel is an excuse" for attacking opposition figures. "Karroubi and figures like him and other freedom-seekers are the real enemies of authoritarians."

Yasser Khomeini, a grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, also visited Karroubi at his home to express concern about the attack, according to Sahamnews.

On Thursday, Tehran police chief Gen. Hossein Sajedinia told the semi-official Fars news agency that police forces would be deployed in several parts of Tehran to maintain security during the rallies. There were no reports Friday of any opposition gatherings.

Since the vote, authorities have detained thousands and tried scores on charges of fomenting postelection unrest. More than 80 of them were sentenced to prison terms from six months to 15 years. Ten were sentenced to death, and their cases are being appealed.

Part 3: Theocracy and Democracy

There would also be a democratically elected parliament called the Majlis, a Prime Minister approved by the Majlis, and a popularly elected President. In addition, an elected Assembly of Experts made up of clerics would have the right to select the Supreme Leader. These institutions would make up the elected part of the government and were intended to represent the voice of the people in the new government.

Table 1.1 outlines specific rights and institutions included in the constitution as a compromise to liberal and leftist sentiments. I include the provision along with the article in the constitution where it is included. The provisions in the right column are specifically limited by Islam while the ones in the left column apply under all circumstances. Even though the constitution is progressive in many ways such as a section about the rights of women, it also specifies that those rights have to fall within the limits of Islam. At the same time, other provisions such as the abolishment of torture are supposed to apply under all circumstances.

Table 1.1 Compromises to liberal and leftist sentiments in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Provision Applying in all Circumstances	Article in Constitution	Provision Limited by Islam	Article in Constitution
Protection of Non-Muslims	13, 14	Women’s Rights	21
No State Discrimination	19	Freedom of Press	24
Equality Before the Law	20	Freedom of Association	26
Freedom of Belief	23	Freedom of Assembly	27
Privacy of Communication	25	Right to Work	28
Right to Welfare Benefits	29	Elected Legislature	58, 62
Right to Education	30	Elected President	60, 113, 114
Right to Housing	31
Rights of Arrested	32, 39
Right to Recourse in Courts	34
Right to Council	35
Presumption of Innocence	37
Torture Outlawed	38
Respect of Private Property	47
Public Trials	165
Reasonable Punishments	166

An appointed 12 member group of clerics known as the Guardian Council would monitor the elected branches of government to make sure their activities fall within the guidelines of Islam. Also an unofficial Expediency Council would be appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve disputes between the elected parts of the government and their clerical supervisors. The Expediency Council would officially become part of the constitution as part of referendum held in 1989.

The most important difference in the new draft of the constitution was the position of Supreme Leader who would become the clerical Head of State. The Supreme Leader would supervise the direction of the state and would have the final say over all actions of the government. Among the clerics in the regime, he is the top guardian of the people until the eventual return of the 12th Imam. Even with this vast power, the Supreme Leader would still be appointed by the elected Assembly of Experts and they would theoretically have the ability to remove him from power. Khomeini would become the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic despite his earlier pledge to stay out of the new regime.

Table 1.2 outlines the parts of the constitution that endorse theocratic sentiments in particular the idea of Velayat-e Faqih. I again include the provision in the constitution along with the article where it is included. These provisions demonstrate the non-secular nature of the constitution along with the vast authority given to the Supreme Leader.

Table 1.2 Compromises to theocratic sentiments in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Provision	Article of Constitution
State Policy Must Fall within Islamic Criteria	4
Right of Supreme Leader to Rule in Absence of 12th Imam	5
Shii Islam Official State Religion	12
Ultimate Sovereignty Belongs to God	56
Clerical Guardian Council Can Veto Laws	91
Supreme Leader as Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, and Final Arbiter of State Policy	107, 110
Judiciary Appointed by Supreme Leader	110, 157

Under the new constitution, certain important state institutions would be directly elected by the people while others would be appointed. Figure 1.3 shows the different institutions in the Islamic Republic as well as their mode of selection. I have omitted the office of Prime Minister since it was eliminated following the 1989 constitutional revisions. The oval represents the voters who directly elect certain institutions that are represented in the rectangles. The rounded squares represent institutions that are appointed by other parts of the regime through the bent arrows. Thus even with Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution, all power directly or indirectly flows from the voters at least in theory. Appendix C further elaborates the duties of these institutions and who is currently in control of them.

Figure 1.3 Key institutions and their mode of selection in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The new constitution had something to please those who believed in the popular will and those who wanted a strong role for the clergy. Although this approach seemed to create a system destined for conflict, “the Assembly found these qualities the best means for concealing or reconciling their differences, and deferring the practical meaning of these articles for the future Majlis and judiciary”. At least initially, the constitution would create the big tent necessary to create the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Even with the prominent role of the clergy in the new constitution, there was still a significant role for the average citizen to participate in the government compared to the previous regime.
The intense consciousness of the need for popular participation and legitimization through the votes of the people, reflected in the constitution, drew the poorer and less-educated groups into the political process, which provides a sharp contrast to the conditions under the Pahlavi regime. Whatever doubts the people as a whole might have had about the new republic, they continued to participate in the political process, so that in effect it may argued that one of Khomeini’s achievements was to mobilize ordinary people into involvement with the state.

The constitution was put to a popular vote and passed with over 98% of the vote. However, the inclusion of Velayat-e Faqih meant that there were more boycotts and less participation than the referendum on the type of regime a few months earlier.

The compromises in the constitution might have seemed reasonable at the time, but the end result was a fundamentally flawed document. For some it represented a democratic compact with the people that enshrined the doctrine of popular will and ensured fundamental freedoms for all. Others viewed the constitution as giving a select few clerics a divine mandate to rule the people in any manner they see fit.

Although the constitution did specify rights for the people and the ability to elect representatives, it also had many unresolved issues with regards to the extent of clerical power. For example certain basic rights, such as the freedom of assembly, were ambiguous in the new constitution, “public gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam". Liberals saw this stipulation as a clear indication that the people have a right to assemble such as when Mousavi would invoke this section of the constitution 30 years later to justify protests against the regime, “in this same constitution, it clearly says that people are free to hold peaceful gatherings. If only this principle from our national covenant is enacted, be certain that no one in the ruling establishment will have the opportunity to misuse their power”.

Yet the stipulation that the assembly not be detrimental to Islam complicated things since it was not clear who would make that determination and under what circumstances. Those who believed in a more authoritarian view of the state argued that the jurists entrusted to be the guardian of the people had the right to make that determination. If the ruling clerics say that a protest was against Islam, then it is not allowed since they are the final arbiter of state policy. Thus the compromises in the constitution created a path to democracy or dictatorship depending on the political belief on those in power.