Although almost everyone in the regime is certainly guilty of corruption, the judiciary has decided for political reasons to go after Mohammad Reza Rahimi. Rahimi is the top Vice-President and a close ally of Ahmadinejad. It seems that going after him for corruption charges is a sort of revenge by the Larijani brothers for dismissal of Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.
It seems that the conflict within the regime now is between Ahmadinejad and the Larijani borthers (Speaker of the Majlis Ali Larijani and Judiciary Chief Sadeq Larijani). Hopefully the conflict between these members of ther regime will allow an opportunity for the Green Movement to gain power in the chaos of regime in fighting. Here is more on the conflict:
Corruption charges against one of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's most trusted political advisers provided the latest evidence of deep rifts within the Iranian president's own conservative political camp.
The challenge by Ahmadinejad's rivals — one of them the head of the judiciary — could set the tone for a bitter fight leading up to the next big political moment in Iran, parliamentary elections less than a year away.
"This case isn't going to bring down Ahmadinejad, but it may get very ugly," said Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, a regional political analyst at Emirates University. "It's a commentary on the troubled state of Iranian politics at the moment."
Ahmadinejad has faced a growing internal backlash from conservative leaders — including influential parliament speaker Ali Larijani. They are upset by the president's combative nature and deepening links with the vast military-economic network run by the Revolutionary Guard, Iran's most powerful force which led the crackdown on the reformist movement after Ahmadinejad's disputed re-election last year.
The political infighting escalated earlier this month when Ahmadinejad suddenly dismissed his longtime foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, a close ally of Larijani. Many lawmakers and others denounced the move as further evidence of Ahmadinejad's steamrolling style. He dumped Mottaki in apparent retaliation for disagreements that included control over foreign ministry posts.
Shortly after Mottaki's firing, the judiciary headed by Larijani's brother announced the corruption allegations against First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi.
The charges could do more damage to Ahmadinejad and the reputation he has cultivated as aloof from Iran's powerful financial clans and foundations, many run by the Revolutionary Guard.
The developments revealed the increasingly complex political maneuvering within the Islamic Republic as it struggles with economic sanctions and growing international pressure to curb its production of nuclear fuel.
The judiciary last week said Rahimi is facing corruption charges that need to be investigated and will have to stand trial. The details of the accusations against him have not been made public since. Rahimi quickly denied the charges and was expected to present his side at a news conference, possibly later this week.
On Monday, Ahmadinejad's office came to Rahimi's defense, saying that his complaints against the accusations should be investigated, the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported.
But the rumblings have been coming for months against Rahimi, whose position as the top of 12 vice presidents gives him authority to meet visiting prime ministers and other dignitaries and lead Cabinet meetings in Ahmadinejad's absence.
Some of Ahmadinejad's political foes have frequently taken pot shots at Rahimi with allegations of financial misdeeds since a major government-linked embezzlement probe opened in April. At the time, conservative lawmaker Elias Naderan calling Rahimi the "leader of the corruption circle."
Now, a full-scale investigation and possible trial could become a high-stakes proxy clash between Ahmadinejad and Larijani and his backers, who include his brother, judiciary chief Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani.
The immediate battles may be sporadic because all of Iran's political establishment is currently engrossed in painful steps to trim government subsidies, which has already pushed fuel prices up to 400 percent higher.
The economic shock has brought waves of complaints against the government from all sides. Reformists have claimed the billions saved on subsidies will be funneled back to help boost Ahmadinejad and the Revolutionary Guard. Even some hard-liners — Ahmadinejad's political base — have said the price hikes are too fast and too steep.
The rifts point to the next big political test in Iran — parliamentary elections in early 2012. The races will mark the first major balloting since the accusations of vote-rigging after Ahmadinejad's June 2009 victory plunged Iran into its worst internal chaos since the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
It's still uncertain whether the opposition movement can rebound in some form for the parliamentary campaign. But there's little doubt that Larijani and his allies will make a run.
A strong showing would have the twin effect of embarrassing Ahmadinejad and sending a message to the ruling clerics, who have the final word on the candidates for the 2013 presidential election to replace lame duck Ahmadinejad.
"It is unlikely the (Rahimi) dispute will have particular repercussions in the short term," said Hamid Reza Shokouhi, a political analyst in Tehran. "But its impact will be seen in the next parliamentary elections."
It does, however, show Ahmadinejad's shrinking political coterie.
"Supporters of Ahmadinejad are ... a limited group now," said Shokouhi.
But still a very formidable one.
Ahmadinejad continues to enjoy support from the two most potent forces in Iran: the Revolutionary Guard and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who controls the theocracy and its almost limitless powers.
This has been enough to intimidate Ahmadinejad's opponents from going too far. The lines, however, keep shifting in favor of bolder political challenges.
On Sunday, former foreign minister Mottaki was praised in a statement by 260 parliament members — all but 30 — in a direct slap against Ahmadinejad. Last month, dozens of lawmakers signed a petition seeking bring Ahmadinejad into the chamber for questioning over complaints including fiscal mismanagement.
The effort apparently sputtered before getting enough signatures, but it reinforced the sense that Ahmadinejad can be pressured openly without facing the wrath of the supreme leader.
"The fact that Rahimi is being attacked so publicly by conservatives — and even some hard-liners — suggests the political temperature is heating up," said Shadi Hamid, a researcher on Gulf affairs at The Brookings Doha Center in Qatar.
A showdown over Rahimi could also feed into the claims that Ahmadinejad is increasingly embattled and trying to surround himself with staunch loyalists.
Rahimi was appointed as one of Iran's 12 vice presidents in 2005 and rose to the top spot last year. He has taken part in sensitive political meetings, such as visits by Chinese officials.
Last summer, he called the U.S. dollar and euro "dirty" after Iran threatened to stop selling oil in the currencies to protest economic sanctions. He also called Australians "a bunch of cattlemen" and said South Korea "needed to be slapped" after both nations backed sanctions.
Tuesday, December 28, 2010
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
Mousavi and Karroubi Hold Meeting
In their latest meeting, the two discuss the following:
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi held a joint meeting. At the beginning of this meeting which was held in Mehdi Karroubi’s residence, Karroubi and Mousavi while expressing sadness and sorrow regarding the terrorist attacks which occurred last week on Tasooa (Shia religious festival) in the city of Chabahar and resulted in martyrdom of few worshipers and injuring many others, offered their deepest condolences for the families of the victims. Mousavi and Karroubi strongly condemned this terrorist attack and stressed: “The enemies of our nation must not assume that the unity and solidarity of Muslims is jeopardized by these kinds of terrorist attacks.”
Also in this meeting Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi agreed that general plan for regulating government subsides is a plan that has been discussed internationally as a “fundamental and main economic move” but demanded that its implementation be based on “experts’ research” and without any “hype”.
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi expressed deep concern regarding the implementation of the plan to cut subsidies on fuel and basic life necessities given the current weak economy and added: “The implementation of this plan while the country is facing harsh international sanctions, the economy is in recession, unemployment is more than 30% and has spread across the country in most of the provinces, and the inflation is out of control, is a burden that its pressure will be felt by lower income and middle class layers of the society.”
Both parties emphasized: “On one hand the shutdown of factories, their inability to pay the salaries of their workers and the unemployment of workers and on the other hand losing investments due to lack of investment security in the country as well as lack of healthy competition in economy and privatization all forecast a dark future in country’s economy. This situation worsens when there is no will in the government to listen to the opinion of outstanding experts and critics. There must be an environment in the country that economy experts would be able to express their views without hesitation, instead of being confronted.”
In this meeting Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi once again expressed deep sorrow and concern regarding the dire condition of political prisoners and the made-up and unjust issued sentences against them based on the “fabricated” accusations such as “acting against national security” and added: “ The courts have issued heavy sentences against these political prisoners whom unfortunately are from the wide range of layers of society such as artist, teacher, lawyer, student, university professor, cleric, journalist and etc.; and on the other hand there have been inhuman and far from morality treatments against [political prisoners] in prisons, which leaves these political prisoners no other option but to go on hunger strike in order to protest to these actions. Here we urge the political prisoners to end their hunger strike in order to save their lives and assure them that the final victory belongs to them and to the people.”
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi also by reviewing the foreign policy situation of the country in the international arena expressed surprise regarding the non-diplomatic actions of the administration and added: “The foreign policy has become so ridiculous that the appointed foreign minister should hear his dismissal from the president of Senegal [during a diplomatic trip]! These kinds of actions have no outcome but humiliating the country’s reputation in international arena and demonstrate the childish behaviors based on retaliation. These actions have no result but discrediting the country in eyes of international community even more than before. Unfortunately after this humiliating event now both sides of the story are accusing each other of lying, while lying is the key of all sins!”
At the end of this meeting both parties called the “bullying” and “intimidating” remarks and actions of some individuals affiliated with the totalitarian circle, “far from rational” and emphasized: “To this day we are standing firm on the path we have chosen and also in the future we will not retrieve from this path which is nothing but to defend the rightful demands of the people; and we have no fear from threats, insults and false accusations. For us there is no difference between this big prison that holds us to the smaller prison that unjustly holds the other political prisoners. We are hopeful that one day the true “conspirators” would be held accountable for their actions in front of the nation.”
.
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi held a joint meeting. At the beginning of this meeting which was held in Mehdi Karroubi’s residence, Karroubi and Mousavi while expressing sadness and sorrow regarding the terrorist attacks which occurred last week on Tasooa (Shia religious festival) in the city of Chabahar and resulted in martyrdom of few worshipers and injuring many others, offered their deepest condolences for the families of the victims. Mousavi and Karroubi strongly condemned this terrorist attack and stressed: “The enemies of our nation must not assume that the unity and solidarity of Muslims is jeopardized by these kinds of terrorist attacks.”
Also in this meeting Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi agreed that general plan for regulating government subsides is a plan that has been discussed internationally as a “fundamental and main economic move” but demanded that its implementation be based on “experts’ research” and without any “hype”.
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi expressed deep concern regarding the implementation of the plan to cut subsidies on fuel and basic life necessities given the current weak economy and added: “The implementation of this plan while the country is facing harsh international sanctions, the economy is in recession, unemployment is more than 30% and has spread across the country in most of the provinces, and the inflation is out of control, is a burden that its pressure will be felt by lower income and middle class layers of the society.”
Both parties emphasized: “On one hand the shutdown of factories, their inability to pay the salaries of their workers and the unemployment of workers and on the other hand losing investments due to lack of investment security in the country as well as lack of healthy competition in economy and privatization all forecast a dark future in country’s economy. This situation worsens when there is no will in the government to listen to the opinion of outstanding experts and critics. There must be an environment in the country that economy experts would be able to express their views without hesitation, instead of being confronted.”
In this meeting Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi once again expressed deep sorrow and concern regarding the dire condition of political prisoners and the made-up and unjust issued sentences against them based on the “fabricated” accusations such as “acting against national security” and added: “ The courts have issued heavy sentences against these political prisoners whom unfortunately are from the wide range of layers of society such as artist, teacher, lawyer, student, university professor, cleric, journalist and etc.; and on the other hand there have been inhuman and far from morality treatments against [political prisoners] in prisons, which leaves these political prisoners no other option but to go on hunger strike in order to protest to these actions. Here we urge the political prisoners to end their hunger strike in order to save their lives and assure them that the final victory belongs to them and to the people.”
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi also by reviewing the foreign policy situation of the country in the international arena expressed surprise regarding the non-diplomatic actions of the administration and added: “The foreign policy has become so ridiculous that the appointed foreign minister should hear his dismissal from the president of Senegal [during a diplomatic trip]! These kinds of actions have no outcome but humiliating the country’s reputation in international arena and demonstrate the childish behaviors based on retaliation. These actions have no result but discrediting the country in eyes of international community even more than before. Unfortunately after this humiliating event now both sides of the story are accusing each other of lying, while lying is the key of all sins!”
At the end of this meeting both parties called the “bullying” and “intimidating” remarks and actions of some individuals affiliated with the totalitarian circle, “far from rational” and emphasized: “To this day we are standing firm on the path we have chosen and also in the future we will not retrieve from this path which is nothing but to defend the rightful demands of the people; and we have no fear from threats, insults and false accusations. For us there is no difference between this big prison that holds us to the smaller prison that unjustly holds the other political prisoners. We are hopeful that one day the true “conspirators” would be held accountable for their actions in front of the nation.”
.
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Jafar Panahi Sentenced and Banned from Making Films
Sadly acclaimed film Director Jafar Panahi was sentenced today to 6 years in prison and banned from making films for 20 years. Panahi has made such highly renowned films such as White Balloon and The Circle. Panahi is a stronger support of the Green Movement and has been a strong critic of the horrible actions of the regime.
Panahi is one of Iran's greatest artists whose movies rival the best directors from all around. The fact that the regime is going after him not only shows how desperate they have become, but also how they are willing to damage all aspects of Iranian life. The regime wants to control Iranian culture and destroy it to keep their corrupt hold on power. They have tried to silence a great director, but they will ultimately not succeed.
Monday, December 20, 2010
Security Presence Rise as Subsidies Fall
As the regime is forced to cut fuel subsidies due to its own economic incompetence and internation sanctions, the security presence rises to supress any unrest:
Security forces flooded Iran's capital in a warning against possible unrest as fuel prices surged 400 percent Sunday under plans to sharply cut government subsides and ease pressure on an economy struggling with international sanctions.
The so-called economic "surgery" has been planned for months, but was repeatedly delayed over worries of a repeat of gas riots in 2007 and serious political infighting during the standoff with the West over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program.
But the timing for the first painful steps — just after a first round of nuclear talks with international powers and a second planned for early next year — suggests one of the world's leading oil producers is feeling the sting of tightened sanctions. And it might open more room for possible compromises with world powers, including the United States, in exchange for easing the economic squeeze.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told Iranians in a nationally televised speech Saturday that it was finally time to begin trimming the state subsidies that lowered the costs of bread and cooking oil and gave Iran some of the cheapest fuel pump prices in the world. He also noted that he saw "positive points" in talks earlier this month with six nations that hold important sway over sanctions: the five permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany.
"Iran's top leadership is puzzled about the tightening sanctions and their long-term implications on Iran's economy. Ahmadinejad has labeled those sanctions a joke, but the Iranian people are not laughing," said Ehsan Ahrari, an analyst based in Alexandria, Virginia.
The overnight price rises — gas rising fourfold in some cases — follows upheaval in the heart of Ahmadinejad's government. Last week, he abruptly dismissed longtime foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, while he was on a diplomatic mission to Africa in favor of interim replacement, nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi.
The move sends a message that Iran's leadership had tired of Mottaki's challenges to Ahmadinejad and sought a more unified government at a critical time. In his first public comment, Mottaki on Sunday called his blindside firing "un-Islamic, undiplomatic and offensive," according to the semiofficial Mehr news agency.
In Tehran, meanwhile, riot police took up posts around the major intersections as the subsidy cuts took effect. There were loud complaints by consumers, but no signs of the violence in 2007, when the government imposed limits on the purchase of subsidized gasoline.
Under the new system, each personal car receives 60 liters (16 gallons) of subsidized fuel a month costing 40 cents a liter ($1.50 a gallon) — up from the just 10 cents a liter. Further purchases of gas would run 70 cents a liter ($2.69 a gallon), up from just 40 cents.
Tehran says it is paying some $100 billion in subsidies annually, although experts believe the amount is far lower, closer to $30 billion. Iran had planned to slash subsidies before the latest round of sanctions took effect — Ahmadinejad and his allies have long insisted the country's oil-based economy could no longer afford the largesse.
But the latest rounds of sanctions have targeted the core of Iran's economy. Some top European and Asian companies have pulled out of the Iranian market. American embargoes also seek to block the import of pump-ready fuel to Iran — a weak point in a country with vast oil riches but a shortfall in refineries.
Angry taxi drivers complained as the price of fuel rose fourfold overnight.
"I don't know what to do," said one frustrated cab driver, who did not want to be identified for fear of retribution by authorities. "I am not allowed to increase price of my service while I am paying five times more than yesterday."
A truck driver, Mansour Abbasi, said he paid 10 times more on Sunday for natural gas to fuel his vehicle — and complained he could not compensate by hiking his own transport fees.
"If I raise my prices, people will not be able to afford it. Or they may report me," said Abbasi, 43.
Despite the grumbling, there were no reports of clashes in Tehran or other major cities such as Tabriz, Kermanshah, Bandar Abbas, Kerman and Ahvaz. One resident of Ahvaz said some taxi fares doubled.
Economists say the unpopular plan to slash subsidies could stoke inflation already estimated to be more than 20 percent.
One lawmaker said he had expected the extent of price rises overnight to happen gradually over five years.
"I am surprised. We do not know what happened," the lawmaker told The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment. "The price of fuel was supposed to reach about international prices within the next five years and not this year."
Ahmadinejad also said his government was paying $4 billion in bread subsidies, which will also gradually be phased out.
Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a Tehran University professor of politics, said it was too soon to gauge the public reaction to the cuts, and popular unrest could still erupt.
"We have to wait and see how inflation will affect their lives," he told AP.
Opposition websites reported an economic analyst, Fariborz Raeis Dana, was detained after claiming the subsidy cuts were intended to allow Islamic leaders to spend more money on the military and security forces. The reports could not be independently confirmed.
After Ahmadinejad announced the cuts Saturday night — calling it the "biggest surgery" on Iran's economy in 50 years — long lines of cars formed at gas stations in Tehran as Iranians rushed to fill their tanks at subsidized prices before the new ones took effect at midnight. By Sunday, the lines were gone.
Economic analyst Saeed Laylaz said the cuts were in theory a positive move since they would reduce energy consumption, which is currently costing the country a quarter of its Gross National Product.
"However it is being implemented in an incomplete fashion because it's not accompanied by a greater liberalization of the economy," he said, adding that the cuts would probably not have much positive effect.
The government says it will return part of the money obtained from increased prices to the people through cash payments. It has already paid into accounts of some 20 million families as compensation ahead of the cuts.
Every family member will now receive $80 for to help them over the next two months.
Security forces flooded Iran's capital in a warning against possible unrest as fuel prices surged 400 percent Sunday under plans to sharply cut government subsides and ease pressure on an economy struggling with international sanctions.
The so-called economic "surgery" has been planned for months, but was repeatedly delayed over worries of a repeat of gas riots in 2007 and serious political infighting during the standoff with the West over the Islamic Republic's nuclear program.
But the timing for the first painful steps — just after a first round of nuclear talks with international powers and a second planned for early next year — suggests one of the world's leading oil producers is feeling the sting of tightened sanctions. And it might open more room for possible compromises with world powers, including the United States, in exchange for easing the economic squeeze.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told Iranians in a nationally televised speech Saturday that it was finally time to begin trimming the state subsidies that lowered the costs of bread and cooking oil and gave Iran some of the cheapest fuel pump prices in the world. He also noted that he saw "positive points" in talks earlier this month with six nations that hold important sway over sanctions: the five permanent U.N. Security Council members plus Germany.
"Iran's top leadership is puzzled about the tightening sanctions and their long-term implications on Iran's economy. Ahmadinejad has labeled those sanctions a joke, but the Iranian people are not laughing," said Ehsan Ahrari, an analyst based in Alexandria, Virginia.
The overnight price rises — gas rising fourfold in some cases — follows upheaval in the heart of Ahmadinejad's government. Last week, he abruptly dismissed longtime foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, while he was on a diplomatic mission to Africa in favor of interim replacement, nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi.
The move sends a message that Iran's leadership had tired of Mottaki's challenges to Ahmadinejad and sought a more unified government at a critical time. In his first public comment, Mottaki on Sunday called his blindside firing "un-Islamic, undiplomatic and offensive," according to the semiofficial Mehr news agency.
In Tehran, meanwhile, riot police took up posts around the major intersections as the subsidy cuts took effect. There were loud complaints by consumers, but no signs of the violence in 2007, when the government imposed limits on the purchase of subsidized gasoline.
Under the new system, each personal car receives 60 liters (16 gallons) of subsidized fuel a month costing 40 cents a liter ($1.50 a gallon) — up from the just 10 cents a liter. Further purchases of gas would run 70 cents a liter ($2.69 a gallon), up from just 40 cents.
Tehran says it is paying some $100 billion in subsidies annually, although experts believe the amount is far lower, closer to $30 billion. Iran had planned to slash subsidies before the latest round of sanctions took effect — Ahmadinejad and his allies have long insisted the country's oil-based economy could no longer afford the largesse.
But the latest rounds of sanctions have targeted the core of Iran's economy. Some top European and Asian companies have pulled out of the Iranian market. American embargoes also seek to block the import of pump-ready fuel to Iran — a weak point in a country with vast oil riches but a shortfall in refineries.
Angry taxi drivers complained as the price of fuel rose fourfold overnight.
"I don't know what to do," said one frustrated cab driver, who did not want to be identified for fear of retribution by authorities. "I am not allowed to increase price of my service while I am paying five times more than yesterday."
A truck driver, Mansour Abbasi, said he paid 10 times more on Sunday for natural gas to fuel his vehicle — and complained he could not compensate by hiking his own transport fees.
"If I raise my prices, people will not be able to afford it. Or they may report me," said Abbasi, 43.
Despite the grumbling, there were no reports of clashes in Tehran or other major cities such as Tabriz, Kermanshah, Bandar Abbas, Kerman and Ahvaz. One resident of Ahvaz said some taxi fares doubled.
Economists say the unpopular plan to slash subsidies could stoke inflation already estimated to be more than 20 percent.
One lawmaker said he had expected the extent of price rises overnight to happen gradually over five years.
"I am surprised. We do not know what happened," the lawmaker told The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment. "The price of fuel was supposed to reach about international prices within the next five years and not this year."
Ahmadinejad also said his government was paying $4 billion in bread subsidies, which will also gradually be phased out.
Ahmad Bakhshayesh, a Tehran University professor of politics, said it was too soon to gauge the public reaction to the cuts, and popular unrest could still erupt.
"We have to wait and see how inflation will affect their lives," he told AP.
Opposition websites reported an economic analyst, Fariborz Raeis Dana, was detained after claiming the subsidy cuts were intended to allow Islamic leaders to spend more money on the military and security forces. The reports could not be independently confirmed.
After Ahmadinejad announced the cuts Saturday night — calling it the "biggest surgery" on Iran's economy in 50 years — long lines of cars formed at gas stations in Tehran as Iranians rushed to fill their tanks at subsidized prices before the new ones took effect at midnight. By Sunday, the lines were gone.
Economic analyst Saeed Laylaz said the cuts were in theory a positive move since they would reduce energy consumption, which is currently costing the country a quarter of its Gross National Product.
"However it is being implemented in an incomplete fashion because it's not accompanied by a greater liberalization of the economy," he said, adding that the cuts would probably not have much positive effect.
The government says it will return part of the money obtained from increased prices to the people through cash payments. It has already paid into accounts of some 20 million families as compensation ahead of the cuts.
Every family member will now receive $80 for to help them over the next two months.
Friday, December 17, 2010
Part 19: A Fradulent Election
Figure 5.1 Provinces carried by Azeri candidate Mohsen Mehralizadeh in light green and those carried by Mehdi Karroubi in red during the 2005 Presidential Election. In the 2009 presidential election, Mir Hossein Mousavi would only win one of the light green provinces and Karroubi would win no provinces.
While my point is not to prove definitively that the election was fraudulent, it is important to note some reasons why many Iranians themselves viewed the election as completely illegitimate. According to the official results, Ahmadinejad received 63% of the vote to Mousavi’s 34% with Rezei getting 2% and Karroubi just 1%. By getting more than 50% of the vote, Ahmadinejad avoided a runoff which would have continued the campaign. Given the momentum of Mousavi’s campaign, this lopsided victory seemed intrinsically wrong and specific irregularities would reinforce this image.
The first major discrepancy was the fact that Mousavi who is an ethnic Azari, originally from the northwest of Iran, lost in the largest Azari province of East Azerbaijan to Ahmadinejad. Azaeris have traditionally voted for even minor candidates of the same ethnic group, and the fact that Mousavi lost in this province seems highly unlikely. For example in the 2005 election, Mohsen Mehralizadeh ran as a minor reformist candidate garnering just 4% of the vote nationally in the first round. Yet as an ethnic Azari, he received 29% of the vote in East Azerbaijan to Ahmadinejad’s 15% and won the other two predominantly Azari provinces. The fact that such a minor Azari candidate could dominate the region in 2005 would mean that almost everyone expected Mousavi to once again carry the region.
Another reason for skepticism was Karroubi’s unusually low vote totals even among his own ethnic group of the Lurs. While Mousavi certainly became the main candidates of reformist voters, Karroubi still had a constituency within the movement. Karroubi garnered over 5 million votes in the 2005 elections while his official vote total for 2009 was just 333,635 votes. Moreover, Karroubi is also an ethnic Lur meaning that he, like Mousavi among the Azaris, has a natural base among the Lurs of Western Iran. In 2005, Karroubi received 440,247 just in the main Lur province of Lorestan which is more than the total number of votes he got in 2009 in all of Iran. Moreover in 2009, his official vote total in Lorestan decreased to 44,036 which seems highly unlikely given his performance in 2005.
Figure 5.1 is a map of the provinces of Iran with the light green indicating the three provinces the Azari candidate Mehralizadeh carried in the first round of voting in the 2005 presidential election. The red represents the provinces Karroubi carried in the same election which shows his strength in the West of the country. In the 2009 presidential election, Mousavi would only win one of the Azeri provinces and only one other province in the rest of the country. Karroubi would carry no provinces in the whole country since his vote total was less than 10% of what it was in 2005. Clearly such irregularities would lead many in Iran to believe the election was completely fraudulent.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Part 18: How It Could of Happened
In any event, Mousavi became the ultimate dark horse candidate and his campaign caught fire in the short election period before the election on June 12. In many ways, Mousavi and those running his campaign had been underestimated as an organized and technologically advanced campaign started to emerge. Both the man himself and his campaign were more formidable than the conservatives could ever have imagined. There were a few reasons why Mousavi was able to gain traction and prove a viable opponent to Ahmadinejad.
Mousavi’s perceived flaw of being absent from the political scene suddenly became an asset as he became popular among younger Iranians. Nearly two-thirds of Iran’s population is under the age of 30 meaning that they have little or no memory of his time as Prime Minister. In the small inner circle of the Islamic Republic, Mousavi represented the closest thing to an outsider since a large segment of the population did not perceive him as tainted by the regime. Even popular reformist figures such as Khatami and Karroubi were recently in high positions within the Islamic Republic, but Mousavi seemed different because he had been gone for so long.
Another Mousavi asset was something new in Iranian politics: his wife Zahra Rahnavard. It was previously unheard of for the politicians’ wives to play a major role in the politics of the Islamic Republic. While there had been female members of parliament, Zahra Rahnavard became a critical part of her husband’s candidacy.
She appeared with her husband at public rallies and gave interviews about her own views. In particular, she became very popular with the young women of Iran who had few role models in the politics of the Islamic Republic. Her popularity reached a point in which she was compared to the American first lady Michelle Obama although she dismissed such comparisons, “I am not Iran's Michelle Obama. I am Zahra, the follower of Fatimah Zahra [the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad]”.
Technology also played a key role in enabling the Mousavi campaign to pose a serious challenge to Ahmadinejad. His campaign was able to quickly and cheaply mobilize people through newly emerging communication technologies that many young voters easily understood. Mousavi supporters would use text messaging to quickly organize political rallies and relay information about voting which would also be used later on to organize mass protests.
This was also the first election in the Islamic Republic in which the internet played a major role. In particular, the newly emerging social media sites of Twitter and Facebook created a new way for the opposition to organize outside of the tight control of the regime. Campaign platforms and speeches could be posted online for voters to see without first going through the filter of the regime. Mousavi’s official Facebook page would be one of the most important ways for him to communicate with his followers both before and after the election. These tactics became so successful that the regime even shut down Facebook and text messaging in the days leading up to the election in the hopes of slowing Mousavi’s momentum.
Perhaps the Mousavi campaign’s most effective strategy was also its simplest: the selection of green as the official symbol of his campaign. The campaign stated that green was an important color in Islam, but it provided an easy and quickly identifiable image which people could rally around. To the regime, it looked dangerously close to what they considered other “velvet revolutions” such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in which the opposition had used orange as a unifying color against the regime.
The actual campaigning for the election was the most competitive environment in the history of the Islamic Republic. For the first time, contentious debates between the candidates were held on national television with frank accusations of corruption and dictatorship hurled at Ahmadinejad. Mass rallies would be held by all side with thousands of people attending in an election campaign starting to look like those in Western democracies.
A public who had been apathetic about politics during the conservative crackdown of the 2000s suddenly found itself caught up in a competitive election. All sides mobilized their bases and long lines formed on Friday June 12, 2009 as millions of Iranians came out to exercise their right to democratically elect their president. Even though a victory for his campaign seemed impossible a few weeks ago, the surge in support seemed to suggest that Mousavi had a real chance at being the next president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. All of Iran and indeed the world anxiously awaited the results after a long day of voting, and then the results came.
Mousavi’s perceived flaw of being absent from the political scene suddenly became an asset as he became popular among younger Iranians. Nearly two-thirds of Iran’s population is under the age of 30 meaning that they have little or no memory of his time as Prime Minister. In the small inner circle of the Islamic Republic, Mousavi represented the closest thing to an outsider since a large segment of the population did not perceive him as tainted by the regime. Even popular reformist figures such as Khatami and Karroubi were recently in high positions within the Islamic Republic, but Mousavi seemed different because he had been gone for so long.
Another Mousavi asset was something new in Iranian politics: his wife Zahra Rahnavard. It was previously unheard of for the politicians’ wives to play a major role in the politics of the Islamic Republic. While there had been female members of parliament, Zahra Rahnavard became a critical part of her husband’s candidacy.
She appeared with her husband at public rallies and gave interviews about her own views. In particular, she became very popular with the young women of Iran who had few role models in the politics of the Islamic Republic. Her popularity reached a point in which she was compared to the American first lady Michelle Obama although she dismissed such comparisons, “I am not Iran's Michelle Obama. I am Zahra, the follower of Fatimah Zahra [the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad]”.
Technology also played a key role in enabling the Mousavi campaign to pose a serious challenge to Ahmadinejad. His campaign was able to quickly and cheaply mobilize people through newly emerging communication technologies that many young voters easily understood. Mousavi supporters would use text messaging to quickly organize political rallies and relay information about voting which would also be used later on to organize mass protests.
This was also the first election in the Islamic Republic in which the internet played a major role. In particular, the newly emerging social media sites of Twitter and Facebook created a new way for the opposition to organize outside of the tight control of the regime. Campaign platforms and speeches could be posted online for voters to see without first going through the filter of the regime. Mousavi’s official Facebook page would be one of the most important ways for him to communicate with his followers both before and after the election. These tactics became so successful that the regime even shut down Facebook and text messaging in the days leading up to the election in the hopes of slowing Mousavi’s momentum.
Perhaps the Mousavi campaign’s most effective strategy was also its simplest: the selection of green as the official symbol of his campaign. The campaign stated that green was an important color in Islam, but it provided an easy and quickly identifiable image which people could rally around. To the regime, it looked dangerously close to what they considered other “velvet revolutions” such as the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in which the opposition had used orange as a unifying color against the regime.
The actual campaigning for the election was the most competitive environment in the history of the Islamic Republic. For the first time, contentious debates between the candidates were held on national television with frank accusations of corruption and dictatorship hurled at Ahmadinejad. Mass rallies would be held by all side with thousands of people attending in an election campaign starting to look like those in Western democracies.
A public who had been apathetic about politics during the conservative crackdown of the 2000s suddenly found itself caught up in a competitive election. All sides mobilized their bases and long lines formed on Friday June 12, 2009 as millions of Iranians came out to exercise their right to democratically elect their president. Even though a victory for his campaign seemed impossible a few weeks ago, the surge in support seemed to suggest that Mousavi had a real chance at being the next president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. All of Iran and indeed the world anxiously awaited the results after a long day of voting, and then the results came.
Friday, December 10, 2010
Student Day Protests
This past Tuesday, there were a number of protests around Iran particularly in universities to mark Student Day and protest the regime. Here are some clips:
One Year Anniversary of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri's Passing
Although he is gone, his dream of a Free Iran will never die and someday soon will come true.
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Part 17: An Underestimated Threat
The first important thing to note about the June, 12 2009 presidential election was the fact that the liberal Islamist opposition to the regime initially decided to heavily contest the election. After the failure of Khatami to change the Islamic Republic and the victory of Ahmadinejad, it appeared as if the regime’s attempt to destroy the reform movement had succeeded. Yet what remained of the reform movement sensed an opportunity to exploit Ahmadinejad’s unpopularity as a spring board to jump back into power.
Even after the conservative backlash against the reformists, the leaders of the reform movement still believed that elections mattered in the Islamic Republic. The actual counting of votes in the previous elections had been fairly accurate once candidates had been screened out. Thus reformists hoped that a well run campaign could once again mobilize Iranians to defeat the incumbent.
The first indication that the reformists were serious was on February 8, 2009 when former President Khatami declared his candidacy. Khatami had been the most successful reformist politician and remained one of the most popular political figures in the country. Yet his eight years in power were marked by shattered dreams and the ultimate victory of neo-conservatives with the election of Ahmadinejad to succeed Khatami. The announcement sent shockwaves throughout the Iranian political establishment as the reformists had seemed to find a credible challenger to Ahmadinejad.
Another shockwave occurred only a few weeks later on March 9 when former Prime Minister Mousavi declared that he too would run in the election (Sahimi 2010, np). Mousavi had previously turned down opportunities to run for president in 1997 and 2005 and had been largely absent from the political scene since he left the regime in 1989. His reemergence during this critical period was puzzling given not only his absence from politics, but also since Khatami had already declared his candidacy.
A little more than a week after Mousavi declared his candidacy; Khatami dropped out of the race on March 16 and officially endorsed Mousavi’s campaign (Najibullah 2009, np). Khatami claimed that he did not want to split the reformist vote with Mousavi given the reformist fiasco in the 2005 presidential election. In that election, two candidates split the reformist vote causing Ahmadinejad to move on to the runoff and not a reformist candidate. Whatever the reason why Khatami dropped out, it was clear that he was no longer the sole leader of the reform movement.
Mousavi was once again a major player in the Islamic Republic and was quickly getting back in the thick of things 20 years after leaving the regime. Former Majlis Speaker Karroubi had declared his candidacy before either Khatami or Mousavi and also had a significant following within the reform movement. Moreover other reformist candidates declared their candidacy, but only Mousavi and Karroubi were approved by the Guardian Council to run (British Broadcasting Coopeartion 2009, np). As the election started to tighten, there were calls for Karroubi to also drop out of the race and endorse Mousavi, but he would remain in the election until the end.
Initially, it seemed as if Ahmadinejad had a clear path to re-election even with Mousavi and Karroubi running against him. Khatami seemed like the most serious challenger because of his past popularity, but he dropped out. Former commander of the IRGC and Rafsanjani ally Mohsen Rezaei ran as a pragmatic conservative alternative to Ahmadinejad, but he lacked a base among the people. Finally, the conservative coalition remained loyal to the incumbent and threw the backing of the regime to ensure his victory.
Despite all of these things, what resulted was the most heavily contested election in the history of the Islamic Republic. At first Mousavi was largely been written off as uncharismatic and unable to energize the reform movement in order to pose a serious challenge to Ahmadinejad. He was described as a technocrat who was out of touch with the concerns of the common man and who had been absent from the regime for two decades.
This image of Mousavi and the incumbents’ natural advantages meant that the Guardian Council would approve his candidacy. The regime had previously used the Guardian Council to bar candidates from running denying reformists the chance to winning elections most prominently in 2004 parliamentary elections. The approval of candidates takes place a mere three weeks before the election making the official campaign cycle very short.
The conservatives made a critical mistake by allowing Mousavi to run in the election as they underestimated both him and the resilience of the reform movement. Moreover, they had not realized widespread dissatisfaction with the regime as their past electoral victories did not translate into popularity among the people. Had the conservatives barred reformists from running in the first place, then perhaps the mass protests that happened after the election may never have occurred.
Even after the conservative backlash against the reformists, the leaders of the reform movement still believed that elections mattered in the Islamic Republic. The actual counting of votes in the previous elections had been fairly accurate once candidates had been screened out. Thus reformists hoped that a well run campaign could once again mobilize Iranians to defeat the incumbent.
The first indication that the reformists were serious was on February 8, 2009 when former President Khatami declared his candidacy. Khatami had been the most successful reformist politician and remained one of the most popular political figures in the country. Yet his eight years in power were marked by shattered dreams and the ultimate victory of neo-conservatives with the election of Ahmadinejad to succeed Khatami. The announcement sent shockwaves throughout the Iranian political establishment as the reformists had seemed to find a credible challenger to Ahmadinejad.
Another shockwave occurred only a few weeks later on March 9 when former Prime Minister Mousavi declared that he too would run in the election (Sahimi 2010, np). Mousavi had previously turned down opportunities to run for president in 1997 and 2005 and had been largely absent from the political scene since he left the regime in 1989. His reemergence during this critical period was puzzling given not only his absence from politics, but also since Khatami had already declared his candidacy.
A little more than a week after Mousavi declared his candidacy; Khatami dropped out of the race on March 16 and officially endorsed Mousavi’s campaign (Najibullah 2009, np). Khatami claimed that he did not want to split the reformist vote with Mousavi given the reformist fiasco in the 2005 presidential election. In that election, two candidates split the reformist vote causing Ahmadinejad to move on to the runoff and not a reformist candidate. Whatever the reason why Khatami dropped out, it was clear that he was no longer the sole leader of the reform movement.
Mousavi was once again a major player in the Islamic Republic and was quickly getting back in the thick of things 20 years after leaving the regime. Former Majlis Speaker Karroubi had declared his candidacy before either Khatami or Mousavi and also had a significant following within the reform movement. Moreover other reformist candidates declared their candidacy, but only Mousavi and Karroubi were approved by the Guardian Council to run (British Broadcasting Coopeartion 2009, np). As the election started to tighten, there were calls for Karroubi to also drop out of the race and endorse Mousavi, but he would remain in the election until the end.
Initially, it seemed as if Ahmadinejad had a clear path to re-election even with Mousavi and Karroubi running against him. Khatami seemed like the most serious challenger because of his past popularity, but he dropped out. Former commander of the IRGC and Rafsanjani ally Mohsen Rezaei ran as a pragmatic conservative alternative to Ahmadinejad, but he lacked a base among the people. Finally, the conservative coalition remained loyal to the incumbent and threw the backing of the regime to ensure his victory.
Despite all of these things, what resulted was the most heavily contested election in the history of the Islamic Republic. At first Mousavi was largely been written off as uncharismatic and unable to energize the reform movement in order to pose a serious challenge to Ahmadinejad. He was described as a technocrat who was out of touch with the concerns of the common man and who had been absent from the regime for two decades.
This image of Mousavi and the incumbents’ natural advantages meant that the Guardian Council would approve his candidacy. The regime had previously used the Guardian Council to bar candidates from running denying reformists the chance to winning elections most prominently in 2004 parliamentary elections. The approval of candidates takes place a mere three weeks before the election making the official campaign cycle very short.
The conservatives made a critical mistake by allowing Mousavi to run in the election as they underestimated both him and the resilience of the reform movement. Moreover, they had not realized widespread dissatisfaction with the regime as their past electoral victories did not translate into popularity among the people. Had the conservatives barred reformists from running in the first place, then perhaps the mass protests that happened after the election may never have occurred.
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