Part 17: An Underestimated Threat

The first important thing to note about the June, 12 2009 presidential election was the fact that the liberal Islamist opposition to the regime initially decided to heavily contest the election. After the failure of Khatami to change the Islamic Republic and the victory of Ahmadinejad, it appeared as if the regime’s attempt to destroy the reform movement had succeeded. Yet what remained of the reform movement sensed an opportunity to exploit Ahmadinejad’s unpopularity as a spring board to jump back into power.

Even after the conservative backlash against the reformists, the leaders of the reform movement still believed that elections mattered in the Islamic Republic. The actual counting of votes in the previous elections had been fairly accurate once candidates had been screened out. Thus reformists hoped that a well run campaign could once again mobilize Iranians to defeat the incumbent.

The first indication that the reformists were serious was on February 8, 2009 when former President Khatami declared his candidacy. Khatami had been the most successful reformist politician and remained one of the most popular political figures in the country. Yet his eight years in power were marked by shattered dreams and the ultimate victory of neo-conservatives with the election of Ahmadinejad to succeed Khatami. The announcement sent shockwaves throughout the Iranian political establishment as the reformists had seemed to find a credible challenger to Ahmadinejad.

Another shockwave occurred only a few weeks later on March 9 when former Prime Minister Mousavi declared that he too would run in the election (Sahimi 2010, np). Mousavi had previously turned down opportunities to run for president in 1997 and 2005 and had been largely absent from the political scene since he left the regime in 1989. His reemergence during this critical period was puzzling given not only his absence from politics, but also since Khatami had already declared his candidacy.

A little more than a week after Mousavi declared his candidacy; Khatami dropped out of the race on March 16 and officially endorsed Mousavi’s campaign (Najibullah 2009, np). Khatami claimed that he did not want to split the reformist vote with Mousavi given the reformist fiasco in the 2005 presidential election. In that election, two candidates split the reformist vote causing Ahmadinejad to move on to the runoff and not a reformist candidate. Whatever the reason why Khatami dropped out, it was clear that he was no longer the sole leader of the reform movement.

Mousavi was once again a major player in the Islamic Republic and was quickly getting back in the thick of things 20 years after leaving the regime. Former Majlis Speaker Karroubi had declared his candidacy before either Khatami or Mousavi and also had a significant following within the reform movement. Moreover other reformist candidates declared their candidacy, but only Mousavi and Karroubi were approved by the Guardian Council to run (British Broadcasting Coopeartion 2009, np). As the election started to tighten, there were calls for Karroubi to also drop out of the race and endorse Mousavi, but he would remain in the election until the end.

Initially, it seemed as if Ahmadinejad had a clear path to re-election even with Mousavi and Karroubi running against him. Khatami seemed like the most serious challenger because of his past popularity, but he dropped out. Former commander of the IRGC and Rafsanjani ally Mohsen Rezaei ran as a pragmatic conservative alternative to Ahmadinejad, but he lacked a base among the people. Finally, the conservative coalition remained loyal to the incumbent and threw the backing of the regime to ensure his victory.

Despite all of these things, what resulted was the most heavily contested election in the history of the Islamic Republic. At first Mousavi was largely been written off as uncharismatic and unable to energize the reform movement in order to pose a serious challenge to Ahmadinejad. He was described as a technocrat who was out of touch with the concerns of the common man and who had been absent from the regime for two decades.

This image of Mousavi and the incumbents’ natural advantages meant that the Guardian Council would approve his candidacy. The regime had previously used the Guardian Council to bar candidates from running denying reformists the chance to winning elections most prominently in 2004 parliamentary elections. The approval of candidates takes place a mere three weeks before the election making the official campaign cycle very short.

The conservatives made a critical mistake by allowing Mousavi to run in the election as they underestimated both him and the resilience of the reform movement. Moreover, they had not realized widespread dissatisfaction with the regime as their past electoral victories did not translate into popularity among the people. Had the conservatives barred reformists from running in the first place, then perhaps the mass protests that happened after the election may never have occurred.