The UN General Assembly is nearly empty as Ahmadinejad gives his speech showing that he has little support around the world.
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
UN Empty for Ahmadinejad Speech
The UN General Assembly is nearly empty as Ahmadinejad gives his speech showing that he has little support around the world.
Shouts of God is Great
Shouts of God is Great are heard in Tehran on September 20 to protest the government repression.
Thursday, September 16, 2010
Part 13: The Rise of the Neo-Conservatives
Once the reformists’ efforts at change had been successfully stopped, conservatives would turn their focus on regaining control of the elected branches of the regime. At this point, a new group emerged within the regime and formed a coalition with the traditional conservatives to create an authoritarian state. They can be defined as neo-conservatives “who are ideologically Islamist, revolutionary in character, and populist in application and policy term”.
Part of their emergence has to do with increase American influence in the region in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As the United States would first invade Afghanistan and then Iraq, Iran would be surrounded on two sides by American troops. The regime would further feel threatened by the Bush administration categorizing the Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil”. Moreover as details of the Iranian nuclear program began to emerge, tensions between Iran and the West would only continue to rise.
The Khatami administration had previously attempted a détente with the United States hoping for better relations, and this new hostility from the Bush administration discredited such an approach. Factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would begin to criticize the reformists for their soft stance against the United States and would call for a more hostile stand.
The IRGC was created in the aftermath of the revolution as the branch of the armed services that would be loyal to Khomeini and his Islamist faction in Iran. Overtime they evolved into the most influential branch of the military with shadow operations in the rest of the government and throughout the country. The IRGC would become a breeding ground for the neo-conservatives who were militaristic in nature and who wanted a more hostile foreign policy.
American military intervention in the Middle East and threats against the Iranian regime would give the neo-conservatives the perfect opportunity to gain prominence in the regime. Compared to the traditional conservatives, the authoritarianism of the neo-conservatives would be based less on religious principles and more on the classical militarism of fascist regimes. A former IRGC member, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would emerge as one of the new leaders of the neo-conservative movement and would lead them to the heights of power in the Islamic Republic.
This new alliance of traditional conservatives and neo-conservatives would first take aim at the 2003 local elections in an effort to turn the tide of reformist electoral victories. By this point, much of the reformists’ base in the population had become disillusioned at their inability to bring real change to the regime. Enthusiasm for the local election plummeted with 49% participation and only 12-15% turnout in the reformist strongholds of big cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad.
The conservative capitalized on this moment of weakness among the reformists and scored a smashing victory in the local elections. They won a majority of all the seats up for grabs around the country and were able to win 14 of the 15 seats in the pivotal Tehran City Council. This dominance in Iran’s biggest city and capital allowed the neo-conservatives to appoint Ahmadinejad as the Mayor of Tehran giving him a platform to eventually seek higher office.
Even with the vacuum of enthusiasm among the reformists’ base, the conservative coalition would use the authoritarian parts of the constitution to make victory certain in the 2004 Majlis elections. The Guardian Council would disqualify nearly 2500 reformist candidates including 80 sitting members of the Majlis. This unprecedented move shocked the reformists who contemplated a boycott, but ultimately decided against doing so as it would have handed the conservatives certain victory.
Even with the setbacks, “the participating reformists, now led by Majlis Speaker Karroubi, who had cobbled together a list of some 120 candidates, was confidently predicting a presence of some 100 seats in the Seventh Majlis”. Yet the reformists’ woefully underestimated the public’s unhappiness at both the regime and the reformists as turnout would plummet to 51% from a high of 69% in 2000 Majlis elections. Conservatives and neo-conservatives dominated the elections putting them back in control of the Majlis and dashing reformist dreams of passing progressive laws to change the regime.
Part of their emergence has to do with increase American influence in the region in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. As the United States would first invade Afghanistan and then Iraq, Iran would be surrounded on two sides by American troops. The regime would further feel threatened by the Bush administration categorizing the Iran as part of the “Axis of Evil”. Moreover as details of the Iranian nuclear program began to emerge, tensions between Iran and the West would only continue to rise.
The Khatami administration had previously attempted a détente with the United States hoping for better relations, and this new hostility from the Bush administration discredited such an approach. Factions within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) would begin to criticize the reformists for their soft stance against the United States and would call for a more hostile stand.
The IRGC was created in the aftermath of the revolution as the branch of the armed services that would be loyal to Khomeini and his Islamist faction in Iran. Overtime they evolved into the most influential branch of the military with shadow operations in the rest of the government and throughout the country. The IRGC would become a breeding ground for the neo-conservatives who were militaristic in nature and who wanted a more hostile foreign policy.
American military intervention in the Middle East and threats against the Iranian regime would give the neo-conservatives the perfect opportunity to gain prominence in the regime. Compared to the traditional conservatives, the authoritarianism of the neo-conservatives would be based less on religious principles and more on the classical militarism of fascist regimes. A former IRGC member, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, would emerge as one of the new leaders of the neo-conservative movement and would lead them to the heights of power in the Islamic Republic.
This new alliance of traditional conservatives and neo-conservatives would first take aim at the 2003 local elections in an effort to turn the tide of reformist electoral victories. By this point, much of the reformists’ base in the population had become disillusioned at their inability to bring real change to the regime. Enthusiasm for the local election plummeted with 49% participation and only 12-15% turnout in the reformist strongholds of big cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashhad.
The conservative capitalized on this moment of weakness among the reformists and scored a smashing victory in the local elections. They won a majority of all the seats up for grabs around the country and were able to win 14 of the 15 seats in the pivotal Tehran City Council. This dominance in Iran’s biggest city and capital allowed the neo-conservatives to appoint Ahmadinejad as the Mayor of Tehran giving him a platform to eventually seek higher office.
Even with the vacuum of enthusiasm among the reformists’ base, the conservative coalition would use the authoritarian parts of the constitution to make victory certain in the 2004 Majlis elections. The Guardian Council would disqualify nearly 2500 reformist candidates including 80 sitting members of the Majlis. This unprecedented move shocked the reformists who contemplated a boycott, but ultimately decided against doing so as it would have handed the conservatives certain victory.
Even with the setbacks, “the participating reformists, now led by Majlis Speaker Karroubi, who had cobbled together a list of some 120 candidates, was confidently predicting a presence of some 100 seats in the Seventh Majlis”. Yet the reformists’ woefully underestimated the public’s unhappiness at both the regime and the reformists as turnout would plummet to 51% from a high of 69% in 2000 Majlis elections. Conservatives and neo-conservatives dominated the elections putting them back in control of the Majlis and dashing reformist dreams of passing progressive laws to change the regime.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Part 12: The Reformists Blink
One of the most famous victims of this effort would be the reformist intellectual Saeed Hajjarian who was the leading architect of the reformists’ electoral victories and who was himself elected to the Tehran City Council in the 1999 local elections. In March 2000, Hajjarian was shot in the face leaving him paralyzed in an attack that reformists would attribute to the paramilitary group known as the Basij. Others would also be swept up in this new round of institutionalized terror aimed at undermining the reform movement.
Prominent reformist clerics such as Abdollah Nouri, Yousefi Eshkevari, and Mohsen Kadivar would be tried and sentenced to varying time in prison for supposedly undermining the Islamic Republic (Tapper et. al 2006, 133). These clerics, with their religious critiques of the regime, posed a particularly devastating threat to a regime that based much of its legitimacy on religious credentials. The combined effects of political violence and arrests would deprive the reformists of some of their leading intellectuals just as they would need them the most.
With the takeover of the Majlis in 2000, the stage was set for a confrontation between reformists who wanted to pass progressive legislation and conservatives in the regime who wanted to stop democratic change. Reformists had an ambitious agenda to transform the Islamic Republic by passing laws to reform press freedoms, women’s rights, elections, and overall transparency within the regime. Although conservatives allowed the reformists to get their foot in the door of the elected institutions in the regime, they would use the authoritarian components of the constitution to render the reformists impotent in their attempt to change the regime.
As reformists started to introduce pieces of legislation to reform the system, Khamenei would take unprecedented steps to interfere in the elected branches of the government and undermine their efforts at reform. The defining moment would come in November 2000 when the Majlis was considering a new Press Law that would challenge conservative restrictions on the media. Khamenei sent a letter to the Speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi “urging that in the interests of stability and harmony the legislation be deferred to an unspecified later date”.
In this moment of truth, the reformists backed down and allowed Khamenei to successfully shelve the proposed law. Rarely had the Supreme Leader ever taken such direct actions to basically dictate the business of the Majlis. Given the vast powers of the Supreme Leader within the constitution, it is not clear whether he was making a request or if he had the authority to dictate what the elected branches of the government could do. In the end, Khamenei effectively was able to stop the Majlis from considering pieces of legislation meaning that the reformists’ effort to pass progressive legislation was dead.
With his legislative agenda defeated by the conservatives, Khatami went into the 2001 presidential elections with little to show for in terms of major reforms. At the same time, conservatives were even more unpopular than before precisely because they had undermined the reformists’ efforts to change the regime. Voters still wanted to have Khatami as the president and he was re-elected with 78% of the vote over token conservative opposition. Yet it was a shallow victory for Khatami and the reformists since the previous year had shown that winning elections did not translate into changing policy in the Islamic Republic.
At this point, the reformists were still willing to participate in the elections and work within the confines of the regime. While their experience in elected government had shown that real change could not be quickly brought to the regime, they were still part of that same regime. In the end, they had in an incentive to maintain the system and work from within to slowly bring about change. As the conservatives would begin their complete purge of reformists from the elected branches of government, that incentive would eventually disappear.
Prominent reformist clerics such as Abdollah Nouri, Yousefi Eshkevari, and Mohsen Kadivar would be tried and sentenced to varying time in prison for supposedly undermining the Islamic Republic (Tapper et. al 2006, 133). These clerics, with their religious critiques of the regime, posed a particularly devastating threat to a regime that based much of its legitimacy on religious credentials. The combined effects of political violence and arrests would deprive the reformists of some of their leading intellectuals just as they would need them the most.
With the takeover of the Majlis in 2000, the stage was set for a confrontation between reformists who wanted to pass progressive legislation and conservatives in the regime who wanted to stop democratic change. Reformists had an ambitious agenda to transform the Islamic Republic by passing laws to reform press freedoms, women’s rights, elections, and overall transparency within the regime. Although conservatives allowed the reformists to get their foot in the door of the elected institutions in the regime, they would use the authoritarian components of the constitution to render the reformists impotent in their attempt to change the regime.
As reformists started to introduce pieces of legislation to reform the system, Khamenei would take unprecedented steps to interfere in the elected branches of the government and undermine their efforts at reform. The defining moment would come in November 2000 when the Majlis was considering a new Press Law that would challenge conservative restrictions on the media. Khamenei sent a letter to the Speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi “urging that in the interests of stability and harmony the legislation be deferred to an unspecified later date”.
In this moment of truth, the reformists backed down and allowed Khamenei to successfully shelve the proposed law. Rarely had the Supreme Leader ever taken such direct actions to basically dictate the business of the Majlis. Given the vast powers of the Supreme Leader within the constitution, it is not clear whether he was making a request or if he had the authority to dictate what the elected branches of the government could do. In the end, Khamenei effectively was able to stop the Majlis from considering pieces of legislation meaning that the reformists’ effort to pass progressive legislation was dead.
With his legislative agenda defeated by the conservatives, Khatami went into the 2001 presidential elections with little to show for in terms of major reforms. At the same time, conservatives were even more unpopular than before precisely because they had undermined the reformists’ efforts to change the regime. Voters still wanted to have Khatami as the president and he was re-elected with 78% of the vote over token conservative opposition. Yet it was a shallow victory for Khatami and the reformists since the previous year had shown that winning elections did not translate into changing policy in the Islamic Republic.
At this point, the reformists were still willing to participate in the elections and work within the confines of the regime. While their experience in elected government had shown that real change could not be quickly brought to the regime, they were still part of that same regime. In the end, they had in an incentive to maintain the system and work from within to slowly bring about change. As the conservatives would begin their complete purge of reformists from the elected branches of government, that incentive would eventually disappear.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Part 11: The Student Protests
However, it was also a wakeup call for Khamenei and other conservatives in the regime. While they initially allowed competitive elections with the belief that the reformists would not dominate or seek radical change, it quickly became neither of these things were true. The population had become disillusioned with the conservative leadership of the Islamic Republic and turned to the reformists for another way. Moreover, the reformists were serious in their rhetoric of liberalizing the Islamic Republic and pursued fundamental changes to the regime.
Although both the reformists and conservatives were strong supporters of the concept of an Islamic Republic, they differed sharply on their visions for Iran. Both camps within the regime would claim to be following the true path of Khomeini and the 1979 revolution. The coalition of Islamists that had existed for twenty years was splintering as two irreconcilable visions of the Islamic Republic were now competing for power in Iran.
In this environment, the conservatives made the decision to clamp down on any reformist attempts to change the authoritarian bent of the regime. They would launch a campaign to regain control of the elected branches of the government using any means necessary. This also meant that the reformists would also have to decide how they would respond to the conservative backlash against their efforts to transform the regime.
One of first tests for both the reformists and the conservatives would be during the student protests of July 1999. In effect, the conservative backlash already had started with limits on freedom of speech and the closure of reformist newspapers in early 1999. In this effort, Salam newspaper which belonged to Khatami’s political party was forced to close causing widespread discontent among students at Tehran University.
They organized a peaceful protest against the closure and in support Khatami, but paramilitary groups loyal to conservatives in the regime descended on the university arresting hundreds and killing one student. This incident triggered protests among students throughout the country which was joined by other youths who were generally dissatisfied with the regime.
The 1999 student protests represented the greatest unrest in Iran up to that point since the 1979 revolution, and it would have profound consequences for both the conservatives and reformists. The conservatives’ natural inclination was to put down the protest by force and the paramilitary groups loyal to the regime were able to restore order within a week. Such a response from conservatives was expected, but the actions of Khatami and the reformists deeply disappointed those who wanted them to stand up for the protesters.
At this point in the history of the Islamic Republic, the reformists were committed to changing Iran by working within the regime in a gradual process of reform. Such a mass uprising threatened this process since conservatives might try to crush the overall reform moment if it did not disavow the protests. Moreover, the reformists still believed in the Islamic Republic and chaos on the streets might lead to a situation in which the entire concept of the regime would be threatened.
As Khatami would later say "Am I supposed to declare war against a regime that I accept in principle? I believe that if this regime is gone, it is not at all clear what will follow it - regardless of my religious belief. The people who want to change the constitution and the regime - can they guarantee that once the current regime is gone, Western-style democracy will be established here?"
Since the reformists at this point still had a role in the regime, they temporarily renewed their old alliance with conservatives to restore order in the Islamic Republic. “Despite his deeply held democratic convictions, Khatami proved too much a man of the system” and would criticize the protests as threatening the foundations of the Islamic Republic (Takeyh 2009, 193). The student protests were crushed and the youth of Iran had felt betrayed by the president they had helped to elect. Yet as the reformists were purged from the system in the years to come, they would no longer have an incentive to cooperate in the same way with conservatives to maintain the system.
The student protests was the last time that reformists and conservatives would work together so closely to maintain the Islamic Republic. Although a conservative backlash had started before the student protests, the events of July 1999 helped to galvanize conservatives to use greater authoritarian tactics to regain control of the regime. As a result, conservatives would intensify their crackdown on the reformists not just by closing newspapers, but launching a campaign of arrests and intimidation.
Although both the reformists and conservatives were strong supporters of the concept of an Islamic Republic, they differed sharply on their visions for Iran. Both camps within the regime would claim to be following the true path of Khomeini and the 1979 revolution. The coalition of Islamists that had existed for twenty years was splintering as two irreconcilable visions of the Islamic Republic were now competing for power in Iran.
In this environment, the conservatives made the decision to clamp down on any reformist attempts to change the authoritarian bent of the regime. They would launch a campaign to regain control of the elected branches of the government using any means necessary. This also meant that the reformists would also have to decide how they would respond to the conservative backlash against their efforts to transform the regime.
One of first tests for both the reformists and the conservatives would be during the student protests of July 1999. In effect, the conservative backlash already had started with limits on freedom of speech and the closure of reformist newspapers in early 1999. In this effort, Salam newspaper which belonged to Khatami’s political party was forced to close causing widespread discontent among students at Tehran University.
They organized a peaceful protest against the closure and in support Khatami, but paramilitary groups loyal to conservatives in the regime descended on the university arresting hundreds and killing one student. This incident triggered protests among students throughout the country which was joined by other youths who were generally dissatisfied with the regime.
The 1999 student protests represented the greatest unrest in Iran up to that point since the 1979 revolution, and it would have profound consequences for both the conservatives and reformists. The conservatives’ natural inclination was to put down the protest by force and the paramilitary groups loyal to the regime were able to restore order within a week. Such a response from conservatives was expected, but the actions of Khatami and the reformists deeply disappointed those who wanted them to stand up for the protesters.
At this point in the history of the Islamic Republic, the reformists were committed to changing Iran by working within the regime in a gradual process of reform. Such a mass uprising threatened this process since conservatives might try to crush the overall reform moment if it did not disavow the protests. Moreover, the reformists still believed in the Islamic Republic and chaos on the streets might lead to a situation in which the entire concept of the regime would be threatened.
As Khatami would later say "Am I supposed to declare war against a regime that I accept in principle? I believe that if this regime is gone, it is not at all clear what will follow it - regardless of my religious belief. The people who want to change the constitution and the regime - can they guarantee that once the current regime is gone, Western-style democracy will be established here?"
Since the reformists at this point still had a role in the regime, they temporarily renewed their old alliance with conservatives to restore order in the Islamic Republic. “Despite his deeply held democratic convictions, Khatami proved too much a man of the system” and would criticize the protests as threatening the foundations of the Islamic Republic (Takeyh 2009, 193). The student protests were crushed and the youth of Iran had felt betrayed by the president they had helped to elect. Yet as the reformists were purged from the system in the years to come, they would no longer have an incentive to cooperate in the same way with conservatives to maintain the system.
The student protests was the last time that reformists and conservatives would work together so closely to maintain the Islamic Republic. Although a conservative backlash had started before the student protests, the events of July 1999 helped to galvanize conservatives to use greater authoritarian tactics to regain control of the regime. As a result, conservatives would intensify their crackdown on the reformists not just by closing newspapers, but launching a campaign of arrests and intimidation.
Diplomats Reject Regime
Iranian Diplomats in Europe are rejecting the regime. Here is the story:
A third Iranian diplomat upset with Tehran's post-election crackdown on dissidents has defected in Europe — this time in Belgium, an opposition group said Monday. The announcement came just hours after the No. 2 man at Iran's mission in Helsinki said he will seek asylum in Finland.
The defections are an embarrassment for Iran, which clamped down on citizens after last year's presidential election was followed by large-scale protests and accusations that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won by fraud. Numerous Iranians have been arrested in a continuing crackdown.
The Europe-based Green Wave opposition movement said Farzad Farhangian, press attache at the Iranian Embassy in Brussels, walked out Friday and flew to Oslo. The group's founder, Amir Hossein Jahanchahi, said in a statement that "other defections from diplomats abroad will follow."
It was the third known defection of an Iranian diplomat in Europe this year to protest Tehran's crackdown.
Mohammed Reza Heydari, who was granted asylum in Norway after leaving his post as an Iranian consular official there in January, confirmed that Farhangian had defected in Brussels. Heydari said Farhangian supported the opposition movement that grew out of unrest following the June 2009 election.
"He left the embassy after informing the ambassador that he was leaving and he came here without anyone (else) knowing about this," Heydari said by telephone from Oslo. "Then he contacted me."
No one at the Iranian Embassy in Brussels could be reached for comment after office hours Monday.
Earlier Monday, Iranian diplomat Hossein Alizadeh, who resigned last week from the embassy in Finland, told reporters that he will apply for political asylum in the Nordic country.
"I cannot accept, tolerate this fraud election. The situation got worse because ... my people are being killed still," Alizadeh said in Helsinki. He added that he was no longer a diplomat but "a political dissident," and that he has no political ambitions except to be a member of the opposition.
The Iranian Embassy in Helsinki said in a statement that Alizadeh's term of office had been terminated on Aug. 20. The Finnish Foreign Ministry said that Alizadeh had worked at the embassy in Helsinki since October 2007 and still had diplomatic status. It declined further comment.
"Ahmadinejad is not any more the Iranian leader and he doesn't represent Iran," the 45-year-old Alizadeh said. "Do not take him seriously. He (does) not have any popularity among the Iranians."
He said that since the growth of the opposition after the 2009 election, he "felt confident" that he has "been followed and bugged." His criticism of the regime also led him to worry about the safety of his wife and family who live with him in Finland, including two sons and an eight-year-old daughter.
"Using this language puts me in a situation to look for shelter for myself. I am going to request political asylum from the Finnish government, and here are my passports," he said throwing four of them on a table. "I am going to leave these passports to whoever lets me stay here."
About 2,500 Iranian immigrants live in Finland. Some 300 were granted political asylum in 2008 and 2009, according to official immigration statistics.
A third Iranian diplomat upset with Tehran's post-election crackdown on dissidents has defected in Europe — this time in Belgium, an opposition group said Monday. The announcement came just hours after the No. 2 man at Iran's mission in Helsinki said he will seek asylum in Finland.
The defections are an embarrassment for Iran, which clamped down on citizens after last year's presidential election was followed by large-scale protests and accusations that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won by fraud. Numerous Iranians have been arrested in a continuing crackdown.
The Europe-based Green Wave opposition movement said Farzad Farhangian, press attache at the Iranian Embassy in Brussels, walked out Friday and flew to Oslo. The group's founder, Amir Hossein Jahanchahi, said in a statement that "other defections from diplomats abroad will follow."
It was the third known defection of an Iranian diplomat in Europe this year to protest Tehran's crackdown.
Mohammed Reza Heydari, who was granted asylum in Norway after leaving his post as an Iranian consular official there in January, confirmed that Farhangian had defected in Brussels. Heydari said Farhangian supported the opposition movement that grew out of unrest following the June 2009 election.
"He left the embassy after informing the ambassador that he was leaving and he came here without anyone (else) knowing about this," Heydari said by telephone from Oslo. "Then he contacted me."
No one at the Iranian Embassy in Brussels could be reached for comment after office hours Monday.
Earlier Monday, Iranian diplomat Hossein Alizadeh, who resigned last week from the embassy in Finland, told reporters that he will apply for political asylum in the Nordic country.
"I cannot accept, tolerate this fraud election. The situation got worse because ... my people are being killed still," Alizadeh said in Helsinki. He added that he was no longer a diplomat but "a political dissident," and that he has no political ambitions except to be a member of the opposition.
The Iranian Embassy in Helsinki said in a statement that Alizadeh's term of office had been terminated on Aug. 20. The Finnish Foreign Ministry said that Alizadeh had worked at the embassy in Helsinki since October 2007 and still had diplomatic status. It declined further comment.
"Ahmadinejad is not any more the Iranian leader and he doesn't represent Iran," the 45-year-old Alizadeh said. "Do not take him seriously. He (does) not have any popularity among the Iranians."
He said that since the growth of the opposition after the 2009 election, he "felt confident" that he has "been followed and bugged." His criticism of the regime also led him to worry about the safety of his wife and family who live with him in Finland, including two sons and an eight-year-old daughter.
"Using this language puts me in a situation to look for shelter for myself. I am going to request political asylum from the Finnish government, and here are my passports," he said throwing four of them on a table. "I am going to leave these passports to whoever lets me stay here."
About 2,500 Iranian immigrants live in Finland. Some 300 were granted political asylum in 2008 and 2009, according to official immigration statistics.
Monday, September 13, 2010
Part 10: The Reofrmists Truimph at the Ballot Box
Before 1997, no presidential election in the history of the Islamic Republic had seen anyone other than the regime’s handpicked choice get elected. President Rafsanjani, who won easy re-election in the 1993, was not eligible to run for a third term due to term limits. The standard bearer candidate for the regime elite was conservative cleric Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri who was the Speaker of the Majlis. Behind the scenes, Khamenei endorsed Nategh-Nouri and threw the support of the regime to get him elected. Given the conservative domination of both the elected and unelected institutions of the regime, it seemed a given that Nategh-Nouri would easily be elected the next president of the Islamic Republic.
The 1997 election was the first time that the reform movement would make a serious effort to win the presidency of the Islamic Republic. The first choice of the reformists to run in the election was former Prime Minister Mousavi who had led the radical faction within the regime in the 1980s. Yet, Mousavi refused to run depriving the reformists of a big name who had previously held a senior position within the regime. Instead, the reformists turned to Khatami who had previously implemented limited liberalization as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance during the early therimdor period.
Although Khatami needed approval by the Guardian Council to run in the election, few within the regime thought that he could pose a credible challenge to Nategh-Nouri (Takeyh 2009, 185). He was given approval since he was supposed to have no chance of winning and his token opposition would give the regime a sense of competitiveness. Moreover Khatami talked about creating a more liberal regime, but he did not advocate a radical break from the current regime and was a strong supporter of the Islamic Republic.
Things would not go the way conservatives expected as Khatami’s candidacy quickly gained support among a population yearning for change. He emphasized the rule of law and the constitution in a not too subtle criticism of the conservative leaders who had long ignored liberal components of the constitution. Khatami was a fresh face offering something new and different to a population who were used to the same cast of characters being in charge of the Islamic Republic since the revolution.
The reformists reached out to Iran’s youth who had little memory of the 1979 revolution and instead wanted greater social and cultural freedoms. In particular, the reformists tried to win over young women voters who wanted greater rights in the social and economic spheres. Khatami also appealed to the newly emerging urban middle class who wanted greater political freedoms arguing “economic development must be accompanied by political development”. Khatami’s message was also able to appeal to religious segments in the population given his credentials as a cleric and reformist religious critiques of the regime. This wide ranging coalition made Khatami a credible contender for the presidency and showed the reformists mobilizing large segments of population to fundamentally change the regime.
The extent of Khatami’s landslide victory cannot be overstated as he won 70% of the vote carrying nearly every province and municipality in the country. He received almost three times as many votes as his conservative opponent garnering more than 20 million votes to Nateq-Nouri’s 7 million. Khatami won the greatest number of votes in the history of the Islamic Republic and got twice as many votes as Rafsanjani’s 1993 election victory of 10 million votes.
Moreover, Khatami’s landslide was even more remarkable given the large percentage of the population that participated in the election. One of the reformists’ fundamental arguments was that change could come if the population was be adequately mobilized under the slogan, “pressure from below, negotiations from the top”. Khatami successfully engaged the Iranian population in the electoral process as there was an 83% turnout rate of eligible voters compared to a mere 50% in the 1993 election. This rate was remarkably high for a regime that was supposed to be dominated by authoritarian conservatives and easily exceeded turn out rates in almost all Western democracies.
In 1999, the electoral success of the reformists would continue in the first ever local elections in the Islamic Republic to select representatives for municipal city councils. Unlike presidential and parliamentary elections, local elections do not have the normal Guardian Council screening process to approve candidates. As a result, the reformists were free to put forward the candidates they wanted who went on to be elected to vast numbers. When the votes were counted, the reformists won nearly 75% of the 25 million votes with a turn out rate of 62%.
The reformists capped their series of electoral victories with the 2000 Majlis elections where reformist parties dominated. The Guardian Council allowed many reformists candidates to stand in the election making it one of the most open and free parliamentary elections in the history of the modern Middle East. Again there were high levels of participation with 69% of eligible voters turning out and reformist parties winning 215 of the 290 seats in the Majlis. With this final electoral domination, the reformists completed their takeover of the elected components of the Islamic Republic and seemed poised to deliver on their goal of creating a more democratic regime.
These elections show a pattern of high public participation in competitive elections when the regime was at the peak of its political openness during the thirmidor period. Essentially, the reformists and the population in general would work within the electoral channels of the regime when elections were relatively free and competitive. This pattern reversed once conservatives clamped down on the reformists and limited the freedom of elections. Yet at the time, Khatami’s presidency and subsequent reformist electoral victories were an earthquake in Iranian politics representing a triumph for the reform movement.
The 1997 election was the first time that the reform movement would make a serious effort to win the presidency of the Islamic Republic. The first choice of the reformists to run in the election was former Prime Minister Mousavi who had led the radical faction within the regime in the 1980s. Yet, Mousavi refused to run depriving the reformists of a big name who had previously held a senior position within the regime. Instead, the reformists turned to Khatami who had previously implemented limited liberalization as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance during the early therimdor period.
Although Khatami needed approval by the Guardian Council to run in the election, few within the regime thought that he could pose a credible challenge to Nategh-Nouri (Takeyh 2009, 185). He was given approval since he was supposed to have no chance of winning and his token opposition would give the regime a sense of competitiveness. Moreover Khatami talked about creating a more liberal regime, but he did not advocate a radical break from the current regime and was a strong supporter of the Islamic Republic.
Things would not go the way conservatives expected as Khatami’s candidacy quickly gained support among a population yearning for change. He emphasized the rule of law and the constitution in a not too subtle criticism of the conservative leaders who had long ignored liberal components of the constitution. Khatami was a fresh face offering something new and different to a population who were used to the same cast of characters being in charge of the Islamic Republic since the revolution.
The reformists reached out to Iran’s youth who had little memory of the 1979 revolution and instead wanted greater social and cultural freedoms. In particular, the reformists tried to win over young women voters who wanted greater rights in the social and economic spheres. Khatami also appealed to the newly emerging urban middle class who wanted greater political freedoms arguing “economic development must be accompanied by political development”. Khatami’s message was also able to appeal to religious segments in the population given his credentials as a cleric and reformist religious critiques of the regime. This wide ranging coalition made Khatami a credible contender for the presidency and showed the reformists mobilizing large segments of population to fundamentally change the regime.
The extent of Khatami’s landslide victory cannot be overstated as he won 70% of the vote carrying nearly every province and municipality in the country. He received almost three times as many votes as his conservative opponent garnering more than 20 million votes to Nateq-Nouri’s 7 million. Khatami won the greatest number of votes in the history of the Islamic Republic and got twice as many votes as Rafsanjani’s 1993 election victory of 10 million votes.
Moreover, Khatami’s landslide was even more remarkable given the large percentage of the population that participated in the election. One of the reformists’ fundamental arguments was that change could come if the population was be adequately mobilized under the slogan, “pressure from below, negotiations from the top”. Khatami successfully engaged the Iranian population in the electoral process as there was an 83% turnout rate of eligible voters compared to a mere 50% in the 1993 election. This rate was remarkably high for a regime that was supposed to be dominated by authoritarian conservatives and easily exceeded turn out rates in almost all Western democracies.
In 1999, the electoral success of the reformists would continue in the first ever local elections in the Islamic Republic to select representatives for municipal city councils. Unlike presidential and parliamentary elections, local elections do not have the normal Guardian Council screening process to approve candidates. As a result, the reformists were free to put forward the candidates they wanted who went on to be elected to vast numbers. When the votes were counted, the reformists won nearly 75% of the 25 million votes with a turn out rate of 62%.
The reformists capped their series of electoral victories with the 2000 Majlis elections where reformist parties dominated. The Guardian Council allowed many reformists candidates to stand in the election making it one of the most open and free parliamentary elections in the history of the modern Middle East. Again there were high levels of participation with 69% of eligible voters turning out and reformist parties winning 215 of the 290 seats in the Majlis. With this final electoral domination, the reformists completed their takeover of the elected components of the Islamic Republic and seemed poised to deliver on their goal of creating a more democratic regime.
These elections show a pattern of high public participation in competitive elections when the regime was at the peak of its political openness during the thirmidor period. Essentially, the reformists and the population in general would work within the electoral channels of the regime when elections were relatively free and competitive. This pattern reversed once conservatives clamped down on the reformists and limited the freedom of elections. Yet at the time, Khatami’s presidency and subsequent reformist electoral victories were an earthquake in Iranian politics representing a triumph for the reform movement.
Friday, September 10, 2010
Part 9: Reformists Vs. Conservatives
Once the intellectual foundations of the reform movement had been laid out, it was time to puts these theories to use in the Islamic Republic. The reformists had created a civil society to develop their vision of a new Islamic Republic, but they still had to find a way to implement this vision. The elections at the end of the 1990s would give the reformists an opportunity to capture the elected branches of government and bring change.
Yet the possibility of major change to the regime would upset conservatives who saw a challenge to their dominance and to their belief in an authoritarian regime. The conservatives would launch a campaign to stop the reformists from actually making the changes that they had theorized. Ironically, the thermidor period would set the Islamist coalition on a path towards conflict since the regime would soon not be big enough for the both of them.
Conservatives and liberals Islamists still believed in the Islamic Republic, but their conception of what that meant started to drastically drift. While they would continue to compete for power within the same regime, it would become increasingly difficult for them to peacefully coexist with each other. In place of the Islamist coalition, a new coalition would rise within the regime to challenge the liberal threat made up of conservatives who wanted to create an authoritarian regime.
The election of a little known cleric, Muhammad Khatami, to the presidency of the Islamic Republic in 1997 sent shockwaves throughout Iran and the world. For the first time in its history, a candidate not handpicked by the elite of the regime had reached the highest elected position in the Islamic Republic. Moreover, his election with nearly 70% of the vote demonstrated widespread dissatisfaction with the direction of the regime and its authoritarian tendencies.
Khatami’s election was a triumph for the reform movement and marked the culmination of the thermidor period. The period of moderation after the reign of terror allowed liberal Islamists within the regime to challenge its authoritarian bent through contesting elections. Reformist sweeps in the local elections of 1999 and the 2000 Majlis elections would give further credence to their argument that change could come from within the regime.
Indeed, these relatively free elections along with the victory of opposition candidates seemed to demonstrate that Iran had something approaching one of the few pluralistic governments in the Middle East. The period of 1997 to 2000 marked a period in which the regime allowed unprecedented amounts of competitiveness in the electoral system and this resulted in high levels of participation by the opposition and the overall population. Since it seemed like change could come through elections, the reform movement decided to work within the confines of the regime.
Yet Khatami’s election and other reformist victories set off the inevitable backlash from factions within the regime that feared possible liberalization. As a result, the coalition between liberal and conservative Islamists forged in the 1980s to save the Islamic Republic would become strained leading to its eventual collapse. In its place, a new coalition would emerge composed of traditional conservatives and neo-conservatives united in their goal of defeating the reformists and creating a more authoritarian regime.
The conservatives would strike back by vetoing laws and barring candidates from running in elections to undermine reformist efforts at liberalization. The reformists were unable to deliver on their promise of substantive change and the regime largely maintained its authoritarian bent. The masses who had hoped for real change became disillusioned with the reformists and public participation in elections declined considerably after the regime began its crackdown. Under these conditions, the conservatives were able to regain control of regime culminating with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
While the hardliners were able to stop internal attempts to change the regime, they could not quell the mass public discontentment that had spurred reformist electoral success. The stage was set for another showdown between liberal and conservative Islamists in the 2009 presidential election leading to the complete collapse of the coalition that had maintained the Islamic Republic for 30 years. This period of reformist electoral success and the conservative backlash marks the beginning of the crackdown that would eventually lead to the creation of a fully authoritarian regime in 2009.
Yet the possibility of major change to the regime would upset conservatives who saw a challenge to their dominance and to their belief in an authoritarian regime. The conservatives would launch a campaign to stop the reformists from actually making the changes that they had theorized. Ironically, the thermidor period would set the Islamist coalition on a path towards conflict since the regime would soon not be big enough for the both of them.
Conservatives and liberals Islamists still believed in the Islamic Republic, but their conception of what that meant started to drastically drift. While they would continue to compete for power within the same regime, it would become increasingly difficult for them to peacefully coexist with each other. In place of the Islamist coalition, a new coalition would rise within the regime to challenge the liberal threat made up of conservatives who wanted to create an authoritarian regime.
The election of a little known cleric, Muhammad Khatami, to the presidency of the Islamic Republic in 1997 sent shockwaves throughout Iran and the world. For the first time in its history, a candidate not handpicked by the elite of the regime had reached the highest elected position in the Islamic Republic. Moreover, his election with nearly 70% of the vote demonstrated widespread dissatisfaction with the direction of the regime and its authoritarian tendencies.
Khatami’s election was a triumph for the reform movement and marked the culmination of the thermidor period. The period of moderation after the reign of terror allowed liberal Islamists within the regime to challenge its authoritarian bent through contesting elections. Reformist sweeps in the local elections of 1999 and the 2000 Majlis elections would give further credence to their argument that change could come from within the regime.
Indeed, these relatively free elections along with the victory of opposition candidates seemed to demonstrate that Iran had something approaching one of the few pluralistic governments in the Middle East. The period of 1997 to 2000 marked a period in which the regime allowed unprecedented amounts of competitiveness in the electoral system and this resulted in high levels of participation by the opposition and the overall population. Since it seemed like change could come through elections, the reform movement decided to work within the confines of the regime.
Yet Khatami’s election and other reformist victories set off the inevitable backlash from factions within the regime that feared possible liberalization. As a result, the coalition between liberal and conservative Islamists forged in the 1980s to save the Islamic Republic would become strained leading to its eventual collapse. In its place, a new coalition would emerge composed of traditional conservatives and neo-conservatives united in their goal of defeating the reformists and creating a more authoritarian regime.
The conservatives would strike back by vetoing laws and barring candidates from running in elections to undermine reformist efforts at liberalization. The reformists were unable to deliver on their promise of substantive change and the regime largely maintained its authoritarian bent. The masses who had hoped for real change became disillusioned with the reformists and public participation in elections declined considerably after the regime began its crackdown. Under these conditions, the conservatives were able to regain control of regime culminating with the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
While the hardliners were able to stop internal attempts to change the regime, they could not quell the mass public discontentment that had spurred reformist electoral success. The stage was set for another showdown between liberal and conservative Islamists in the 2009 presidential election leading to the complete collapse of the coalition that had maintained the Islamic Republic for 30 years. This period of reformist electoral success and the conservative backlash marks the beginning of the crackdown that would eventually lead to the creation of a fully authoritarian regime in 2009.
Thursday, September 9, 2010
Esfandiar Rahim Mashai and Division in the Islamic Republic
Great article that details the division within the Islamic Republic in particular regarding Ahmadinejad's crony Esfandiar Rahim Mashai:
IN THE summer of 2009 Iran’s divided conservatives came together to save the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, after his disputed re-election provoked huge street protests by the reformist Green Movement. To have lost Mr Ahmadinejad to a liberal “plot” would, they judged, have imperilled the Islamic Republic which succours them all.
All the same, many conservatives are far from enamoured of Iran’s president. Challenging him, however, is turning out to be a different matter. Barely a year into his second and constitutionally final term, his future is again the object of dark speculation, only this time by people who once professed to be his friends. His immediate entourage, in particular, is being castigated and none more so than the man whom, it is thought, Mr Ahmadinejad would like to succeed him: his old friend and relation by marriage, Esfandiar Rahim Mashai.
As the president’s closest adviser, the slim, handsome, self-confident Mr Mashai has come to represent all that traditionalists in Shia Iran find odious about Mr Ahmadinejad’s presidency. The Islamic Republic was founded on the idea that the Muslim community awaits the reappearance of the hidden “12th imam”, a messianic leader who was “occulted”—hidden by God—in the ninth century; in the meantime it is up to the clergy to run human affairs, under an arrangement known as the Guardianship of the Jurist. Mr Mashai, it is strongly rumoured, believes himself to have a direct link to the hidden imam, and hence regards the intercession of Iran’s clergy as superfluous. He is also said to have encouraged the president’s well-known millenarian tendencies.
For long, Mr Mashai’s critics have expressed their fears sotto voce. Over the course of the summer, however, several conservatives openly raised fears of a campaign among Mr Ahmadinejad’s closest allies to drive the clergy from public life. Last month, a conservative parliamentarian, Hamid Rasai, revealed that the country’s current “guardian-jurist”, the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, had spoken to him and a few other deputies about a “new plot” carrying even greater danger than last year’s protests. Mr Rasai hinted that Mr Mashai and the Green Movement, albeit now much diminished, may be working in sinister concert; after all, he pointed out, both are “uncommitted to the Guardianship of the Jurist”.
Reverence for the hidden imam has long been an accepted part of Shia Islam, but millenarian zeal has produced schismatics in the past—the Bahais, for instance, who are now banned and persecuted. From a position of ostentatious piety, Mr Mashai clearly feels he has the licence to behave provocatively. He has renounced hostility for the people of Israel (for which he received a dressing down from Mr Khamenei), suggested that Iran is incapable of dealing with modern challenges, and flirted impiously with a famous actress. Were he a reformist, it is likely that he would have been silenced months ago.
In August Mr Mashai caused perhaps his biggest rumpus to date, when he urged hundreds of expatriate Iranians, who had been invited to Tehran at government expense, to act as propagandists for a national ideology, as opposed to an Islamic one. Lacing his address with references to Iran’s pre-Islamic history and claiming that Iran had saved Islam from Arab parochialism, Mr Mashai’s patriotic theme provoked a storm of recrimination from members of the religious establishment. “If someone turns away from Islam,” warned Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, a longtime leading government supporter, “we warn him, and then, if that does not work, we beat him.”
In the eyes of his enemies, Mr Mashai’s position at the heart of the government, and his repeated protestations of loyalty to the Guardianship of the Jurist, make him all the more threatening. Last summer Mr Khamenei stripped Mr Mashai of the vice-presidency he had just been awarded, only for the unrepentant Mr Ahmadinejad to appoint him his chief of staff. Nowadays Mr Mashai is more likely to be seen hobnobbing with foreign heads of state in his role as the president’s representative on Middle Eastern affairs.
Mr Mashai is a member of a new diplomatic team that Mr Ahmadinejad has set up independently of the foreign ministry, which is controlled by the supreme leader. The president’s “experts” are not known for their subtlety; his senior vice-president recently called the British “a bunch of imbeciles” and the Australians “cowherds.” The foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, is at odds with some of these presidential experts. In any event, they have a serious intent: to exploit what they believe to be Iran’s enhanced position in the world and to use it to their advantage back home.
In Mr Ahmadinejad’s view, Iran’s refusal to buckle under increasing international sanctions aimed at halting its progress towards becoming a nuclear power qualifies it as a world player on a level with the old enemy, the United States. Last month Iran passed its latest milestone with the fuelling of its first power-generating reactor, set up long ago by the Russians at Bushehr. Iran’s president has challenged Barack Obama to join him before the media for a “man to man” debate on “world issues” when the two attend the UN’s General Assembly in New York later this month.
Mr Obama is unlikely to give him satisfaction but Mr Ahmadinejad’s opponents fear any sign that the Americans regard him as a possible interlocutor, thereby raising his prestige at home. A senior ayatollah recently denounced those who are “trying to beat a path to negotiations with America”. Mr Mashai, who usually accompanies the president on his trips to New York, has also been accused of meeting a former American ambassador to Israel.
Whatever his ambitions abroad, Mr Ahmadinejad is playing a high-risk game at home. He has offended conservatives by appearing to condone less-than-Islamic dress for women, and has presided over a breakdown in co-operation between the government and parliament. Sanctions are starting to hurt, with investment dropping in key sectors, including oil and gas. The most painful of the president’s cuts in subsidies has yet to come into effect.
This dispute at the heart of Iran’s ruling establishment may seem arcane. After all, both Mr Ahmadinejad and his traditionalist opponents agree on the need to repress the Green Movement and to press on towards nuclear self-sufficiency. But the president fits uncomfortably into the country’s power structure, which rewards collegiate effort under the supreme leader’s benevolent tutelage. Although the president professes his undying loyalty to Mr Khamenei, his own patent ambition and his friend’s theology have led him perilously close to open defiance.
From the American and Western point of view, the very opacity of Iran’s leadership structure—and the continuing feuds within it—have made diplomacy harder. Indeed, it is unclear who indisputably runs the show, though the supreme leader still has the final say. It is plainly more complex than a struggle between conservatives and reformers.
Ayatollah Khamenei has tried his best to end the infighting, but his authority is limited by his record of support for Mr Ahmadinejad, which may be all that stops parliament from impeaching him. However according to Mr Mashai, it is only a matter of time before “certain people are calling Ahmadinejad an apostate.”
Part 8: Challenging Velayat-e Faqih
Some of the most daring assaults on the regime came from clerics who challenged the theological foundations of the state especially Khomeini’s vision of Velayat-e Faqih. These intellectual clerics included Yousefi Eshkevari, Mohsen Kadivar, Abdollah Nouri, and others who supported a democratic version of Islam. They argued that the idea of unlimited power in the hands of one man was not only wrong, but it was actually against the basic tenets of Shii Islam.
Mohsen Kadivar was a cleric and a disciple of Montazeri who delved into the theolotical foundations of Velayat-e Faqih. He argued that Velayat-e Faqih had no precedent in Shii Islam and was not consistent with the teachings of the faith. Kadviar’s arguments would be expounded upon by other clerics who said it was blasphemy for anyone to claim to rule in the manner of the 12th Imam.
Even though the clerics had knowledge about Islam, they were not the Imams and thus were basically the same as everyone else. Since they were fallible like everyone else, it does not make sense for them to have absolute power such as in the authoritarianism of Velayat-e Faqih. Kadivar argues that “there is no blueprint for the management of the society during the time of occultation. No one has a special mission or authority to guide the society”.
Instead, the reformists presented a vision of Shii Islam that highlighted the democratic principles of the religion. They argued that the idea of justice and opposition to tyranny was critical in Shii Islam going back to the martyrdom of the third Imam Hossein. According to this vision, Hossein and the other Imams dedicated their lives to trying to build a just society in the face of the tyrants of their day.
This version of Shii Islam had been developed before the 1979 revolution by Ali Shariati and other Islamic intellectuals, but reformists would argue that the current Islamic Republic did not reflect these principles. As Khatami would say, “long-lasting tyranny is our chronic pain, and the cure for this chronic pain is the rule of the people. We demand freedom”.
The reformists believed that the only type of government that would be compatible with Shii Islam is democracy. Since Shii Islam opposes tyranny and seeks justice, a democratic government ensures that tyranny cannot take hold and gives justice for all. Elected institutions make sure no one becomes a tyrant and makes everyone equal under God. In essence, the reformists were arguing for a guardianship of the state until the return of the 12th Imam as opposed to a Guardianship of the Jurist. Grand-Ayatollah Montazeri endorsed the reformists’ vision for the state and supported opposition to the regime, “I believe that Islam and democracy can coexist because Islam supports freedom. What the conservative leaders are practicing today is not Islam and I oppose it”.
Clearly the reformists’ critique of Velayat-e Faqih was particularly dangerous to a regime because it came from clerics and made strong Islamic arguments against the current manifestation of the Islamic Republic. The reform movement was beginning to look like an Islamic movement advocating a vision of Islam parallel to the official regime version. It hit the regime at its very source of legitimacy and threatened to take the regime’s base of pious Iranians. As the reform movement gained strength, it would crackdown by throwing Kadivar, Eshkevari, Nouri, and other reformists in prison.
Perhaps the most provocative critique of the regime came from an intellectual who initially led the university purges in the early days of the revolution. Abdolkarim Soroush was one of the leading Islamic intellectuals at the beginning of the revolution and was tapped by the regime to help transform the troublesome universities. In the Iranian Cultural Revolution, Soroush played a key role in purging the universities of Western influence even while facing tremendous backlashes from professors and students.
Ironically once Soroush himself retreated into academia, his pursuit of philosophy and religious studies led to become one of the regime’s fiercest critics. Where reformist clerics argued that Shii Islam mandates a democratic form of government, Soroush took the next step and argued that Islam could mean whatever a society wanted it to mean. “In contrast to revivalists’ Islamic ideology, which interprets the finality of Islam as a sign of its exhaustive rigidity, Soroush contended that Islam’s finality signifies its indeterminate fluidity. The finality of Islam means that every generation experiences revelation anew”.
Soroush was making an argument that applied not to Islam, but a broader observation on all the world’s religions. He viewed religion as something that was constantly changing depending on the historical context. In this theological reality, the best government should be implemented as opposed to a government that religion supposedly mandates. Souroush would advocate democratic government as the best for Iran in the absence of any religiously mandated form of government.
Regardless of how they got to the conclusion, the various reformists all agreed that democracy and an open society was what Iran needed. It was also clear that the current regime was not dedicated to achieving this goal. Given this reality, the reformists would have to figure out how to achieve their desired Iran.
They believed that the democratic components of the constitution were a good starting point and a base from which to build the free society they envisioned. At the same time, the constitution and its elected branches of government allowed a way through which the reformists could reach their goals. Thus the reformists were not advocating an overthrow of the Islamic Republic, but rather a gradual shift in its policies through existing state mechanisms.
Mohsen Kadivar was a cleric and a disciple of Montazeri who delved into the theolotical foundations of Velayat-e Faqih. He argued that Velayat-e Faqih had no precedent in Shii Islam and was not consistent with the teachings of the faith. Kadviar’s arguments would be expounded upon by other clerics who said it was blasphemy for anyone to claim to rule in the manner of the 12th Imam.
Even though the clerics had knowledge about Islam, they were not the Imams and thus were basically the same as everyone else. Since they were fallible like everyone else, it does not make sense for them to have absolute power such as in the authoritarianism of Velayat-e Faqih. Kadivar argues that “there is no blueprint for the management of the society during the time of occultation. No one has a special mission or authority to guide the society”.
Instead, the reformists presented a vision of Shii Islam that highlighted the democratic principles of the religion. They argued that the idea of justice and opposition to tyranny was critical in Shii Islam going back to the martyrdom of the third Imam Hossein. According to this vision, Hossein and the other Imams dedicated their lives to trying to build a just society in the face of the tyrants of their day.
This version of Shii Islam had been developed before the 1979 revolution by Ali Shariati and other Islamic intellectuals, but reformists would argue that the current Islamic Republic did not reflect these principles. As Khatami would say, “long-lasting tyranny is our chronic pain, and the cure for this chronic pain is the rule of the people. We demand freedom”.
The reformists believed that the only type of government that would be compatible with Shii Islam is democracy. Since Shii Islam opposes tyranny and seeks justice, a democratic government ensures that tyranny cannot take hold and gives justice for all. Elected institutions make sure no one becomes a tyrant and makes everyone equal under God. In essence, the reformists were arguing for a guardianship of the state until the return of the 12th Imam as opposed to a Guardianship of the Jurist. Grand-Ayatollah Montazeri endorsed the reformists’ vision for the state and supported opposition to the regime, “I believe that Islam and democracy can coexist because Islam supports freedom. What the conservative leaders are practicing today is not Islam and I oppose it”.
Clearly the reformists’ critique of Velayat-e Faqih was particularly dangerous to a regime because it came from clerics and made strong Islamic arguments against the current manifestation of the Islamic Republic. The reform movement was beginning to look like an Islamic movement advocating a vision of Islam parallel to the official regime version. It hit the regime at its very source of legitimacy and threatened to take the regime’s base of pious Iranians. As the reform movement gained strength, it would crackdown by throwing Kadivar, Eshkevari, Nouri, and other reformists in prison.
Perhaps the most provocative critique of the regime came from an intellectual who initially led the university purges in the early days of the revolution. Abdolkarim Soroush was one of the leading Islamic intellectuals at the beginning of the revolution and was tapped by the regime to help transform the troublesome universities. In the Iranian Cultural Revolution, Soroush played a key role in purging the universities of Western influence even while facing tremendous backlashes from professors and students.
Ironically once Soroush himself retreated into academia, his pursuit of philosophy and religious studies led to become one of the regime’s fiercest critics. Where reformist clerics argued that Shii Islam mandates a democratic form of government, Soroush took the next step and argued that Islam could mean whatever a society wanted it to mean. “In contrast to revivalists’ Islamic ideology, which interprets the finality of Islam as a sign of its exhaustive rigidity, Soroush contended that Islam’s finality signifies its indeterminate fluidity. The finality of Islam means that every generation experiences revelation anew”.
Soroush was making an argument that applied not to Islam, but a broader observation on all the world’s religions. He viewed religion as something that was constantly changing depending on the historical context. In this theological reality, the best government should be implemented as opposed to a government that religion supposedly mandates. Souroush would advocate democratic government as the best for Iran in the absence of any religiously mandated form of government.
Regardless of how they got to the conclusion, the various reformists all agreed that democracy and an open society was what Iran needed. It was also clear that the current regime was not dedicated to achieving this goal. Given this reality, the reformists would have to figure out how to achieve their desired Iran.
They believed that the democratic components of the constitution were a good starting point and a base from which to build the free society they envisioned. At the same time, the constitution and its elected branches of government allowed a way through which the reformists could reach their goals. Thus the reformists were not advocating an overthrow of the Islamic Republic, but rather a gradual shift in its policies through existing state mechanisms.
Wednesday, September 8, 2010
Part 7: The Birth of the Reform Movement
The radicals would go head to head with the conservatives at the ballot box during the 1992 Majlis elections. Although fully fledged political parties had not yet developed, two blocs emerged for the Majlis election. One group was closely aligned to Rafsanjani and his policies of economic liberalization. They also had the support of Khamenei and supported his authoritarian political views. The other groups consisted of the radicals who wanted greater state intervention in the economy and believed in a more open society.
In the Iranian electoral system, candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council in order to run in elections. Behind the scenes, Khamenei and the regime threw the regime’s support behind the conservative bloc and actively worked to get these candidates elected. 2000 candidates were approved for the parliamentary elections, but the radicals complained that nearly 1000 of their candidates were not allowed to run. In a tactic perfected in years to come, the regime began to manipulate elections even while still holding them thereby maintaining a façade of democracy.
Yet the fact that elections even took place and some opposition candidates were allowed to stand for election and be elected shows that Iran at this point was not a classic authoritarian state. Despite Khamenei and the conservative bloc’s absolutist pretensions, as well as their manipulation of the Islamic Republic’s processes, Iran did not become a typical totalitarian state such as Saddam’s Iraq. The constitutional structure that still invested some power in elected bodies ensure the Iranian people and their representatives would have a voice in the state’s deliberations. This period of moderation with somewhat competitive elections would not last forever as Iran was slowly drifting towards authoritarianism.
The 1992 parliamentary elections was a disaster for the radicals as the conservative bloc swept the elections. While the radicals would claim that the regime’s intervention spelled their defeat, the reality was that their views were unpopular with the public (Moslem 2002, 181). Rafsanjani promised to rebuild the Iranian economy in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war by unleashing the power of the market. The radicals simply repackaged old ideas of a state controlled economy when the population wanted to enjoy the prospect of capitalist materialism after of years rationing and scarcity during the war.
Perhaps most importantly, the 1992 parliamentary elections sent the radicals further into the political wilderness emerging eventually as the reform movement. “The 1992 election debacle proved to be a watershed event, as many of the disqualified candidates retreated into private order to reevaluate their dogma and identity”. The elections may not have changed the regime as the radical had hoped, but it changed the radicals leading to future electoral success as the reform movement.
It is important to note that the regime’s opposition was still willing to work within the confines of the regime even though they believed the conservatives influenced the electoral results. Instead of becoming an outside protest movement in the Islamic Republic, the opposition focused on its message and prepared for the next round of elections. This strategy of changing the regime through elections was only viable if the opposition believed it could win future elections. Once it became clear in 2009 that it was impossible for the opposition to win elections, then there no longer would be incentive to remain within the regime.
Although Rafsanjani largely endorsed Khamenei’s authoritarian view of the state, he was much more of a pragmatist than the Supreme Leader. He realized that people would need greater political rights in order to achieve better economic results. Greater freedom and choice in the economic realm would mean that people would expect similar rights when it came to politics. Moreover if there was less political tension within the country, the population could devout more of its energy to achieving the best possible economic results.
To that end, Rafsanjani appointed as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance a cleric named Muhammad Khatami who started to slowly implement political liberalization. Khatami’s ministry had discretion over the amount of government censorship and also the amount of freedom the media could enjoy. Khatami held a more democratic vision of Islam and believed that the revolution had been fought to secure basic rights stating, “freedom of thought and respect for intellectual honor are among the prime goals of the revolution”.
While Khatami had a limit to the amount of freedom he could grant, the regime certainly did become more open to debate and increased political speech during this time. For example, the regime allowed more journals and newspapers to exist with the number increasing from 102 in 1988 to 370 in 1992. This political opening gave Islamists who opposed the authoritarian policies of the regime greater flexibility to publically discuss and debate their beliefs. The relatively open political environment created the conditions for intellectual and academic debate which would be critical for the creation of the reform movement.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war also had a significant influence on the development of the reform movement. While the 1992 electoral debacle made the opposition reflect on their own failures, the Iran-Iraq war made them think about the regime’s failures. The war had cost Iran nearly one million causalities and drained the nation’s coffers and resources. The end result was the pre-war status quo and a failure to export the revolution to Shii majority Iraq. This caused many of the most steadfast Islamic supporters of the revolution to question the regime’s actions and the direction it was taking.
One of the most important objectives of the revolution was to remove foreign influence from Iran since it was believed that it was the cause of many of the country’s fundamental problems. Yet with the removal of foreign elements complete, Iran still had many of the problems that it faced during foreign intervention in the country. While some reverted to blaming traditional foreign imperialists for these failures, a group of intellectuals began to look within for the source of Iran’s problems.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989 inaugurated a moment of self-reflection among emerging intellectuals who no longer sought to identify the roots of Iranian political, social, and economic problems in its colonial history. For many, the time had come to put internal dynamics rather than external interventions, at the center of the debate over the predicament of modernity and social change in Iran.
As a result, the reform movement was born out of an intellectual revolution among Islamists who began to question the direction of the Islamic Republic. Reflecting on the authoritarian drift of the regime and their own place within the system, the former radicals began to rethink the original purpose of the revolution. They started to view the revolution not just as a struggle to once again make Iran Islamic, but rather as a social justice movement meant to ensure equality and freedom for the Iranian people. In other words Islam was not an end in itself, but it was supposed to be the means that would create the end of a free and just society. The realization that the current regime did not live up to these ideals meant that the reformists would delve into the foundations of the Islamic Republic and more deeply into the very meaning of Islam.
In the Iranian electoral system, candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council in order to run in elections. Behind the scenes, Khamenei and the regime threw the regime’s support behind the conservative bloc and actively worked to get these candidates elected. 2000 candidates were approved for the parliamentary elections, but the radicals complained that nearly 1000 of their candidates were not allowed to run. In a tactic perfected in years to come, the regime began to manipulate elections even while still holding them thereby maintaining a façade of democracy.
Yet the fact that elections even took place and some opposition candidates were allowed to stand for election and be elected shows that Iran at this point was not a classic authoritarian state. Despite Khamenei and the conservative bloc’s absolutist pretensions, as well as their manipulation of the Islamic Republic’s processes, Iran did not become a typical totalitarian state such as Saddam’s Iraq. The constitutional structure that still invested some power in elected bodies ensure the Iranian people and their representatives would have a voice in the state’s deliberations. This period of moderation with somewhat competitive elections would not last forever as Iran was slowly drifting towards authoritarianism.
The 1992 parliamentary elections was a disaster for the radicals as the conservative bloc swept the elections. While the radicals would claim that the regime’s intervention spelled their defeat, the reality was that their views were unpopular with the public (Moslem 2002, 181). Rafsanjani promised to rebuild the Iranian economy in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war by unleashing the power of the market. The radicals simply repackaged old ideas of a state controlled economy when the population wanted to enjoy the prospect of capitalist materialism after of years rationing and scarcity during the war.
Perhaps most importantly, the 1992 parliamentary elections sent the radicals further into the political wilderness emerging eventually as the reform movement. “The 1992 election debacle proved to be a watershed event, as many of the disqualified candidates retreated into private order to reevaluate their dogma and identity”. The elections may not have changed the regime as the radical had hoped, but it changed the radicals leading to future electoral success as the reform movement.
It is important to note that the regime’s opposition was still willing to work within the confines of the regime even though they believed the conservatives influenced the electoral results. Instead of becoming an outside protest movement in the Islamic Republic, the opposition focused on its message and prepared for the next round of elections. This strategy of changing the regime through elections was only viable if the opposition believed it could win future elections. Once it became clear in 2009 that it was impossible for the opposition to win elections, then there no longer would be incentive to remain within the regime.
Although Rafsanjani largely endorsed Khamenei’s authoritarian view of the state, he was much more of a pragmatist than the Supreme Leader. He realized that people would need greater political rights in order to achieve better economic results. Greater freedom and choice in the economic realm would mean that people would expect similar rights when it came to politics. Moreover if there was less political tension within the country, the population could devout more of its energy to achieving the best possible economic results.
To that end, Rafsanjani appointed as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance a cleric named Muhammad Khatami who started to slowly implement political liberalization. Khatami’s ministry had discretion over the amount of government censorship and also the amount of freedom the media could enjoy. Khatami held a more democratic vision of Islam and believed that the revolution had been fought to secure basic rights stating, “freedom of thought and respect for intellectual honor are among the prime goals of the revolution”.
While Khatami had a limit to the amount of freedom he could grant, the regime certainly did become more open to debate and increased political speech during this time. For example, the regime allowed more journals and newspapers to exist with the number increasing from 102 in 1988 to 370 in 1992. This political opening gave Islamists who opposed the authoritarian policies of the regime greater flexibility to publically discuss and debate their beliefs. The relatively open political environment created the conditions for intellectual and academic debate which would be critical for the creation of the reform movement.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war also had a significant influence on the development of the reform movement. While the 1992 electoral debacle made the opposition reflect on their own failures, the Iran-Iraq war made them think about the regime’s failures. The war had cost Iran nearly one million causalities and drained the nation’s coffers and resources. The end result was the pre-war status quo and a failure to export the revolution to Shii majority Iraq. This caused many of the most steadfast Islamic supporters of the revolution to question the regime’s actions and the direction it was taking.
One of the most important objectives of the revolution was to remove foreign influence from Iran since it was believed that it was the cause of many of the country’s fundamental problems. Yet with the removal of foreign elements complete, Iran still had many of the problems that it faced during foreign intervention in the country. While some reverted to blaming traditional foreign imperialists for these failures, a group of intellectuals began to look within for the source of Iran’s problems.
The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989 inaugurated a moment of self-reflection among emerging intellectuals who no longer sought to identify the roots of Iranian political, social, and economic problems in its colonial history. For many, the time had come to put internal dynamics rather than external interventions, at the center of the debate over the predicament of modernity and social change in Iran.
As a result, the reform movement was born out of an intellectual revolution among Islamists who began to question the direction of the Islamic Republic. Reflecting on the authoritarian drift of the regime and their own place within the system, the former radicals began to rethink the original purpose of the revolution. They started to view the revolution not just as a struggle to once again make Iran Islamic, but rather as a social justice movement meant to ensure equality and freedom for the Iranian people. In other words Islam was not an end in itself, but it was supposed to be the means that would create the end of a free and just society. The realization that the current regime did not live up to these ideals meant that the reformists would delve into the foundations of the Islamic Republic and more deeply into the very meaning of Islam.
Monday, September 6, 2010
Part 6: Life After Khomeini
Then right before the death of Khomeini, a series of changes of the Constitution were proposed to make the Islamic Republic run more efficiently and effectively. Given the conflict between Khamenei and Mousavi, the post of Prime Minister would be eliminated leaving only the President as the Head of Government. The Expediency Council would become an official body in the Islamic Republic to better mediate in conflicts between the elected Majlis and the unelected clerical Guardian Council. In addition, the requirements to be Supreme Leader would be loosened to allow any cleric to hold the position whereas before only top ranking Grand-Ayatollahs could qualify. Khomeini gave his approval to changes and they were passed in a referendum held during the same time as the July 1989 presidential election.
The change in requirements to be Supreme Leader was important because Khomeini was on his deathbed in 1989 and his previous heir apparent was no longer going to be the next leader of the Islamic Republic. Grand-Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri had been one of Khomeini’s most loyal followers during the revolution and was one of the strongest proponents of including Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution. However, Montazeri became increasingly disillusioned with the authoritarian nature of the regime and what he felt was the misuse of the Velayat-e Faqih as a mandate for dictatorship. Once designated to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader; Montazeri would fall out of favor with his onetime teacher and mentor.
The reign of terror was winding down due to the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the frail health of Khomeini. Just before the end of the war, Iraq launched a military campaign with the help of the MKO. The regime took the opportunity for one last round of executions of political prisoners in particular those associated with the MKO and thousands would be executed right before the end of the war. Although the executions were secret at the time, details would slowly emerge in the coming months about the scope of the executions.
Montazeri dared to speak out by publishing an open letter in which he criticized Khomeini for the executions and denial of basic rights to the people. Montazeri’s willingness to speak out demonstrated that the regime could no longer operate in the same manner as the initial revolutionary moment or during the war. Prominent members of the regime were no longer willing to look the other way at regime’s abuses since the external threat of a war with Iraq no longer justified it. As a result, the reign of terror would come to an end and the regime no longer had free reign to execute whomever it wanted. Yet the timing of Montazeri’s criticisms just a few months before the death of Khomeini meant that he no longer was going to be the next Supreme Leader as Khomeini bluntly told him in a letter, “you are no longer eligible to succeed me as the legitimate leader of the state”.
On June 3, 1989 Khomeini died at the age of 86 and the Islamic Republic of Iran had lost the man who had led its tumultuous first 10 years. With the new loosened requirements to be Supreme Leader, President Khamenei was elevated to the highest position in the Islamic Republic. As Supreme Leader, Khamenei went about adapting the regime to both its new constitutional changes and life after its charismatic first leader who had maintained order over the last 10 years.
Khamenei was only a mid level cleric and he was picked over many other higher ranking clerics. This lack of clerical standing would continue to haunt Khamenei with lingering questions about his qualifications to be Supreme Leader and his absolute power in the regime. Questions would also arise about the entire institution of the Supreme Leader since it was becoming an increasingly political and not religious role.
The new Supreme Leader and the newly elected President Rafsanjani began to further centralize power within the regime. Rafsanjani was primarily concerned about the economic direction of the country and set about rebuilding the economy in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. He advocated free market reforms to spur economic growth after 8 years of heavy state control and rationing during the war. Although the state would have less control over the economy, Rafsanjani personally would have more power over the economy and other aspects of the state than his predecessors as president. The elimination of the post of Prime Minister and Khamenei’s relatively weak position as Supreme Leader compared to Khomeini meant that Rafsanjani would have tremendous influence in the regime.
In addition to Rafsanjani’s growing power, Khamenei and other conservatives argued that the recent constitutional changes were passed to centralize the command structure of the regime. In order to increase efficiency, the Supreme Leader should increase his ability to govern in any manner he felt appropriate. According to this logic, the constitutional reforms made efficiency the top priority of the state necessitating a strong Supreme Leader. Popular will and human rights become secondary concerns behind the effectiveness of the state in implementing its policies.
The radicals were opposed to this authoritarian view on the constitutional changes and started to increasingly challenge the ruling conservative faction of the regime. As Mousavi argued shortly after leaving office in 1989 "Imam [Khomeini] demanded ‘centralization in executive affairs,’ not the centralization of executive matter in the hands of one person who manipulates all resources, responsibilities, and finances without any accountability. The meaning of centralization is not that people in charge are not accountable, and may disregard opposition to their policies. If we give authority to anybody in government, we need to expect dissent and disagreement. Every person, including the [Supreme] Leader, in the government must be accountable to the law and act within the frame of the constitution".
Thus just a few months after the death of Khomeini, his disciples were already disagreeing about what he intended the Islamic Republic to look like.
At this point, Mousavi was out of office and the radicals had fallen out of favor with the conservatives running the regime. Mousavi’s old adversary Khamenei was now in charge of the Islamic Republic and Rafsanjani was the powerful new president. The radicals opposed both Khamenei’s desire to create a more authoritarian regime and Rafsanjani’s free market reforms, but now they had little power in the regime.
They were entering the political wilderness and would have to figure out a way to once again come to power in the Islamic Republic. As for Mousavi himself, he would leave politics dissatisfied with the direction of the regime, “in the last days of Imam Khomeini's life, I foresaw major changes in the government and predicted that I won't be there anymore”. Mousavi would reenter politics 20 years later only to have his prediction once again proven right.
The change in requirements to be Supreme Leader was important because Khomeini was on his deathbed in 1989 and his previous heir apparent was no longer going to be the next leader of the Islamic Republic. Grand-Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri had been one of Khomeini’s most loyal followers during the revolution and was one of the strongest proponents of including Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution. However, Montazeri became increasingly disillusioned with the authoritarian nature of the regime and what he felt was the misuse of the Velayat-e Faqih as a mandate for dictatorship. Once designated to succeed Khomeini as Supreme Leader; Montazeri would fall out of favor with his onetime teacher and mentor.
The reign of terror was winding down due to the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the frail health of Khomeini. Just before the end of the war, Iraq launched a military campaign with the help of the MKO. The regime took the opportunity for one last round of executions of political prisoners in particular those associated with the MKO and thousands would be executed right before the end of the war. Although the executions were secret at the time, details would slowly emerge in the coming months about the scope of the executions.
Montazeri dared to speak out by publishing an open letter in which he criticized Khomeini for the executions and denial of basic rights to the people. Montazeri’s willingness to speak out demonstrated that the regime could no longer operate in the same manner as the initial revolutionary moment or during the war. Prominent members of the regime were no longer willing to look the other way at regime’s abuses since the external threat of a war with Iraq no longer justified it. As a result, the reign of terror would come to an end and the regime no longer had free reign to execute whomever it wanted. Yet the timing of Montazeri’s criticisms just a few months before the death of Khomeini meant that he no longer was going to be the next Supreme Leader as Khomeini bluntly told him in a letter, “you are no longer eligible to succeed me as the legitimate leader of the state”.
On June 3, 1989 Khomeini died at the age of 86 and the Islamic Republic of Iran had lost the man who had led its tumultuous first 10 years. With the new loosened requirements to be Supreme Leader, President Khamenei was elevated to the highest position in the Islamic Republic. As Supreme Leader, Khamenei went about adapting the regime to both its new constitutional changes and life after its charismatic first leader who had maintained order over the last 10 years.
Khamenei was only a mid level cleric and he was picked over many other higher ranking clerics. This lack of clerical standing would continue to haunt Khamenei with lingering questions about his qualifications to be Supreme Leader and his absolute power in the regime. Questions would also arise about the entire institution of the Supreme Leader since it was becoming an increasingly political and not religious role.
The new Supreme Leader and the newly elected President Rafsanjani began to further centralize power within the regime. Rafsanjani was primarily concerned about the economic direction of the country and set about rebuilding the economy in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. He advocated free market reforms to spur economic growth after 8 years of heavy state control and rationing during the war. Although the state would have less control over the economy, Rafsanjani personally would have more power over the economy and other aspects of the state than his predecessors as president. The elimination of the post of Prime Minister and Khamenei’s relatively weak position as Supreme Leader compared to Khomeini meant that Rafsanjani would have tremendous influence in the regime.
In addition to Rafsanjani’s growing power, Khamenei and other conservatives argued that the recent constitutional changes were passed to centralize the command structure of the regime. In order to increase efficiency, the Supreme Leader should increase his ability to govern in any manner he felt appropriate. According to this logic, the constitutional reforms made efficiency the top priority of the state necessitating a strong Supreme Leader. Popular will and human rights become secondary concerns behind the effectiveness of the state in implementing its policies.
The radicals were opposed to this authoritarian view on the constitutional changes and started to increasingly challenge the ruling conservative faction of the regime. As Mousavi argued shortly after leaving office in 1989 "Imam [Khomeini] demanded ‘centralization in executive affairs,’ not the centralization of executive matter in the hands of one person who manipulates all resources, responsibilities, and finances without any accountability. The meaning of centralization is not that people in charge are not accountable, and may disregard opposition to their policies. If we give authority to anybody in government, we need to expect dissent and disagreement. Every person, including the [Supreme] Leader, in the government must be accountable to the law and act within the frame of the constitution".
Thus just a few months after the death of Khomeini, his disciples were already disagreeing about what he intended the Islamic Republic to look like.
At this point, Mousavi was out of office and the radicals had fallen out of favor with the conservatives running the regime. Mousavi’s old adversary Khamenei was now in charge of the Islamic Republic and Rafsanjani was the powerful new president. The radicals opposed both Khamenei’s desire to create a more authoritarian regime and Rafsanjani’s free market reforms, but now they had little power in the regime.
They were entering the political wilderness and would have to figure out a way to once again come to power in the Islamic Republic. As for Mousavi himself, he would leave politics dissatisfied with the direction of the regime, “in the last days of Imam Khomeini's life, I foresaw major changes in the government and predicted that I won't be there anymore”. Mousavi would reenter politics 20 years later only to have his prediction once again proven right.
Poem For Iran
الان و فردا
الان
ایران
سیاه
است
الان
ایران
ساکت
است
الان
من
مریض
هستم
فردا
ایران
سبز
است
فردا
ایران
اذاد
است
فردا
من
سالم
هستم
Now and Tomorrow
Now
Iran
Is
Black
Now
Iran
Is
Quite
Now
I
Am
Sick
Tomorrow
Iran
Is
Green
Tomorrow
Iran
Is
Free
Tomorrow
I
Am
Healthy
الان
ایران
سیاه
است
الان
ایران
ساکت
است
الان
من
مریض
هستم
فردا
ایران
سبز
است
فردا
ایران
اذاد
است
فردا
من
سالم
هستم
Now and Tomorrow
Now
Iran
Is
Black
Now
Iran
Is
Quite
Now
I
Am
Sick
Tomorrow
Iran
Is
Green
Tomorrow
Iran
Is
Free
Tomorrow
I
Am
Healthy
Sunday, September 5, 2010
Part 5: Khomeini's Followers Begin to Split
The end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988 and the death of Supreme Leader Khomeini in June 1989 marked the end of an era for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the one year period between August 1988 and August 1989, these two events and a series of other major changes led to a period of transition for the regime. The pillars that maintained the initial revolutionary moment in Iran were gone and the Islamic Republic would have to adapt to a new order. Those who now were in charge of the country in the wake of these changes would begin a process of normalization to maintain the Islamic Republic in this new environment.
In the wake of this transition, the reign of terror in Iran would finally come to an end and a period of moderation would take place for roughly the next decade. What Brinton calls the thermidor period occurs in all post-revolutionary societies when the initial zeal for the revolution wanes within the regime and the overall population. “This tends to occur shortly after the death or ousting of the charismatic figure, though signs can often be seen during the leader's reign”.
In the Iranian case, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of the revolution’s charismatic leader Khomeini meant that the thermidor would begin in the Islamic Republic around 1989. In this period of moderation, the regime allowed greater political freedoms leading to the creation of a vibrant civil society in Iran. This environment allowed liberal Islamist intellectuals to question the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and even the concept of the Islamic Republic.
As the reign of terror ended in Iran and a moderate political environment developed, the coalition of Islamists forged to create the Islamic Republic would begin to collapse. Khomeini’s disciples disagreed over the fundamental nature of the regime and fiercely competed for power in the years to come. In this competition, some of the most loyal followers of Khomeini started to question the very foundations of the Islamic Republic. Ultimately, these liberal Islamists would join together to create the reform movement aimed at transforming the regime from within.
At the same time, those who wanted to maintain a more authoritarian regime would initially have the upper hand in this transition period. While they had to allow limited liberalization, conservatives in the regime were still able to keep a tight control on power. This dominance was challenged in the late 1990s as reformists would triumph at the ballot box in three straight elections. In response, the thermidor period would come to an end and conservatives would take steps to reassert their control of the regime.
Even before Khomeini’s death, internal conflict had started within the different Islamist factions of the regime. The most prominent manifestation of this conflict was between then President Ali Khamenei and then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. The two would clash repeatedly over various state policies making governing difficult in the Islamic Republic.
At this early stage, it was becoming apparent that two different camps were emerging within the regime embodied in the rivalry between the two men. Due to his tremendous standing, Khomeini was the final arbiter of all conflicts and would often side with Mousavi over Khamenei. Even though Khomeini attempted to balance the different factions of the regime against each other, division was brewing within the regime and it would only grow after his death.
Mousavi and his faction of the regime represented the leftist and liberal elements within the Islamic movement who wanted greater revolutionary change. They “advocated the cause of the poor, believed in the export of the revolution, maintained a more tolerant view on sociocultural policies, and supported state-sponsored redistributive and egalitarian policies”. Given their desire for a more substantive economic and social change after the revolution, they were dubbed “the radicals” by those who were weary of their intentions in transforming Iran.
However, they made up a significant portion of the Islamist movement within the regime and had strong backing among both the intellectuals and lower classes in the country. Mousavi was appointed Prime Minister to appease this faction within the regime and would serve for eight years managing the nation during the war with Iraq. Over time these radicals began to shift their attention to the authoritarian nature of the regime since they believed in represented an abandonment of the original revolutionary ideas.
Khamenei and the conservative faction of the regime represented a coalition between those who believed in free market economics and a more authoritarian view on government. They did not believe there was a major economic component to the revolution and were against redistribution of wealth to the masses. The conservatives were also weary of the public participation in the governing process and argued for greater clerical control of the government through Velayat-e Faqih. “This faction enjoyed the backing of the traditional Iranian bourgeoisie, the merchants of the bazaar, as well as the ultra-orthodox clergy and the highly religious segments of Iranian society”.
Khamenei and the other conservatives within the regime had to compete with Mousavi as Prime Minister and a significant block of radicals in the Majlis for Khomeini’s favor. Even with their significant differences, the continued internal threat posed by the MKO and the external threat of Iraq caused these two factions to cooperate in order to maintain the Islamic Republic. As the 1980s wore on and the threat to the regime diminished, early cracks in the coalition were already becoming visible.
One of the first major signs of the of the internal conflict was the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party established in 1979 as an umbrella organization for Islamists loyal to Khomeini. By 1987, the different factions within the regime meant that it could no longer operate coherently as the official political party of the Islamist coalition. It became obvious that new political parties would have to emerge in order to represent the increasingly diverse views within the regime.
Khameini and Speaker of the Majlis Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani sent a letter to Khomeini requesting that the Islamic Republican Party be split up. Khomeini gave his approval and the dominant political party in Iran which had helped to create and maintain the Islamic Republic no longer existed. In the coming years, it would be replaced with numerous other political parties each with its own unique vision for the Islamic Republic causing further division within the regime.
The next group to fracture within the regime was the Society of Militant Clergy (SMC) which had been created before the revolution in 1977. It was made up of clerics loyal to Khomeini and who rejected the complacent attitude of others clerics who did not actively oppose the Shah. The divisions apparent in other parts of the regime were also evident in the clergy, and a new clerical organization would be born more aligned with the radicals.
A group of clerics who would later become leading figures in the reform movement including future president Mohammad Khatami and future speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi sent an open letter to Khomeini in 1988 requesting the creation of a new clerical organization.
They reiterated their concern that a split in the SMC might appear a sign of ‘trouble for the revolution.’ They assured the Supreme Leader that they have considered ‘all possible compromises with other respected ruhaniyun [clergy].’ ‘But,’ the letter explained… ‘we have decided to form a new association in the service of the Islamic revolution.’ They called the new organization Majma’-e Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez, or the Association of Militant Clerics (AMC).
In the wake of this transition, the reign of terror in Iran would finally come to an end and a period of moderation would take place for roughly the next decade. What Brinton calls the thermidor period occurs in all post-revolutionary societies when the initial zeal for the revolution wanes within the regime and the overall population. “This tends to occur shortly after the death or ousting of the charismatic figure, though signs can often be seen during the leader's reign”.
In the Iranian case, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of the revolution’s charismatic leader Khomeini meant that the thermidor would begin in the Islamic Republic around 1989. In this period of moderation, the regime allowed greater political freedoms leading to the creation of a vibrant civil society in Iran. This environment allowed liberal Islamist intellectuals to question the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and even the concept of the Islamic Republic.
As the reign of terror ended in Iran and a moderate political environment developed, the coalition of Islamists forged to create the Islamic Republic would begin to collapse. Khomeini’s disciples disagreed over the fundamental nature of the regime and fiercely competed for power in the years to come. In this competition, some of the most loyal followers of Khomeini started to question the very foundations of the Islamic Republic. Ultimately, these liberal Islamists would join together to create the reform movement aimed at transforming the regime from within.
At the same time, those who wanted to maintain a more authoritarian regime would initially have the upper hand in this transition period. While they had to allow limited liberalization, conservatives in the regime were still able to keep a tight control on power. This dominance was challenged in the late 1990s as reformists would triumph at the ballot box in three straight elections. In response, the thermidor period would come to an end and conservatives would take steps to reassert their control of the regime.
Even before Khomeini’s death, internal conflict had started within the different Islamist factions of the regime. The most prominent manifestation of this conflict was between then President Ali Khamenei and then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. The two would clash repeatedly over various state policies making governing difficult in the Islamic Republic.
At this early stage, it was becoming apparent that two different camps were emerging within the regime embodied in the rivalry between the two men. Due to his tremendous standing, Khomeini was the final arbiter of all conflicts and would often side with Mousavi over Khamenei. Even though Khomeini attempted to balance the different factions of the regime against each other, division was brewing within the regime and it would only grow after his death.
Mousavi and his faction of the regime represented the leftist and liberal elements within the Islamic movement who wanted greater revolutionary change. They “advocated the cause of the poor, believed in the export of the revolution, maintained a more tolerant view on sociocultural policies, and supported state-sponsored redistributive and egalitarian policies”. Given their desire for a more substantive economic and social change after the revolution, they were dubbed “the radicals” by those who were weary of their intentions in transforming Iran.
However, they made up a significant portion of the Islamist movement within the regime and had strong backing among both the intellectuals and lower classes in the country. Mousavi was appointed Prime Minister to appease this faction within the regime and would serve for eight years managing the nation during the war with Iraq. Over time these radicals began to shift their attention to the authoritarian nature of the regime since they believed in represented an abandonment of the original revolutionary ideas.
Khamenei and the conservative faction of the regime represented a coalition between those who believed in free market economics and a more authoritarian view on government. They did not believe there was a major economic component to the revolution and were against redistribution of wealth to the masses. The conservatives were also weary of the public participation in the governing process and argued for greater clerical control of the government through Velayat-e Faqih. “This faction enjoyed the backing of the traditional Iranian bourgeoisie, the merchants of the bazaar, as well as the ultra-orthodox clergy and the highly religious segments of Iranian society”.
Khamenei and the other conservatives within the regime had to compete with Mousavi as Prime Minister and a significant block of radicals in the Majlis for Khomeini’s favor. Even with their significant differences, the continued internal threat posed by the MKO and the external threat of Iraq caused these two factions to cooperate in order to maintain the Islamic Republic. As the 1980s wore on and the threat to the regime diminished, early cracks in the coalition were already becoming visible.
One of the first major signs of the of the internal conflict was the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party established in 1979 as an umbrella organization for Islamists loyal to Khomeini. By 1987, the different factions within the regime meant that it could no longer operate coherently as the official political party of the Islamist coalition. It became obvious that new political parties would have to emerge in order to represent the increasingly diverse views within the regime.
Khameini and Speaker of the Majlis Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani sent a letter to Khomeini requesting that the Islamic Republican Party be split up. Khomeini gave his approval and the dominant political party in Iran which had helped to create and maintain the Islamic Republic no longer existed. In the coming years, it would be replaced with numerous other political parties each with its own unique vision for the Islamic Republic causing further division within the regime.
The next group to fracture within the regime was the Society of Militant Clergy (SMC) which had been created before the revolution in 1977. It was made up of clerics loyal to Khomeini and who rejected the complacent attitude of others clerics who did not actively oppose the Shah. The divisions apparent in other parts of the regime were also evident in the clergy, and a new clerical organization would be born more aligned with the radicals.
A group of clerics who would later become leading figures in the reform movement including future president Mohammad Khatami and future speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi sent an open letter to Khomeini in 1988 requesting the creation of a new clerical organization.
They reiterated their concern that a split in the SMC might appear a sign of ‘trouble for the revolution.’ They assured the Supreme Leader that they have considered ‘all possible compromises with other respected ruhaniyun [clergy].’ ‘But,’ the letter explained… ‘we have decided to form a new association in the service of the Islamic revolution.’ They called the new organization Majma’-e Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez, or the Association of Militant Clerics (AMC).
Saturday, September 4, 2010
People Support Dastgheyb
Despite the shameful attack on the Mosque of Ayatollah Dastgheyb, the people of Shiraz pledge their support for him.
Part 4: The Revolution Falls Apart
The constitution was immediately put to the test as conflict between the different political factions was spiraling towards violence. Islamists loyal to Khomeini became alarmed at Bazargan’s attempts to repair relations with the United States since they believed America was plotting to undermine the revolution. They believed that the American embassy in particular was a “Nest of Spies” and on November, 4 1979 a group of revolutionary students would seize the embassy and a number of its employees. Bazargan demanded that Khomeini force the students to release the employees, but Khomeini refused setting off the Iranian hostage crisis.
Bazargan and his provisional government resigned in protest, and the brief rule of moderates after the revolution would come to an end. In the aftermath, revolutionaries loyal to Khomeini would seize control of the government and would begin a reign of terror. While these Islamists were divided among themselves into leftist, liberal, and conservative camps, they were united in their fear that the revolution would fail and the Islamic Republic would collapse. At this point, their main goal was simply to establish the new regime and would endorse the reign the terror as means to that end. The Islamists loyal to Khomeini began to further consolidate power by eliminating liberal, communist, and even moderate Islamist opposition to their dominance of power in Iran.
Then in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran sparking a bloody eight year long conflict. As a result, the prospect of Saddam Hussein taking over the country provided further glue for the Islamist coalition. Moreover, the government intensified its crackdown against all opposition under the banner of national security since the war was “not just to repel invaders but also to cleanse Iran of all secular tendencies”.
The regime rounded up political opponents executing many and throwing many more in prison. These opponents included members of Bazargan’s provisional government such as former deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir-Entezam who would be jailed indefinitely and former Minister of Health Kazem Sami who would later be killed (New York Times 1988, np). Thousands more would flee the country as the reign of terror would engulf Iran.
The purge of opposition to the regime left only Islamists loyal to Khomeini participating within the political system and in positions of power. When the first president of the Islamic Republic Abulhassan Banisadr started to exert independence from Khomeini, he was be branded as a threat to the Islamic republic. He too was swept up in the purges and was forced to flee the country in 1981 as Khomeini loyalists solidified their hold on power. This early precedent made it clear that the elected branches of the government would have to take a back seat to power of the Supreme Leader.
The purges would extend to nearly all aspects of Iranian society as the regime sought to secure its hold on power. In this effort, the regime would launch a process dubbed the Iranian Cultural Revolution to transform Iran’s academic environment. The universities had always been a hotbed of leftist activity, and they provided the last stronghold for opponents of the regime. During the course of the Iranian Cultural Revolution, professors would be purged from their positions and course materials would be rewritten to fall in line with Islamic principles. The end goal was to turn the universities into a loyal component of the Islamic movement, but it would also wreak havoc on Iran’s academia for years to come.
Groups such as the Marxist inspired People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO) began a campaign of bombings and assassinations in response to the government’s own violence. They killed many of the top figures in the regime especially during a devastating bombing that killed both President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. This new internal threat only caused the regime to intensify its reign of terror and confirmed Islamist fears that there was a constant threat to the revolution. In this chaotic situation, Khomeini’s previous statements of an open society free from force were quickly replaced by the political reality of an increasingly authoritarian regime.
At this early state, liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini were willing to overlook gross violations of human rights and the constitution. During the reign of terror, there was a high likelihood of being swept up in the purges if you criticized the regime’s actions. Moreover, real threats to the Islamic Republic existed in the form of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the MKO which in the mind of liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini temporarily justified violations of democratic principles. If the very existence of the Islamic Republic was in danger, then the goal of a truly democratic Iran could be deferred until the regime itself could be secured.
Even though certain Islamists temporarily ignored the violations and intrinsic contradictions of the constitution, the potential for conflict was simply deferred to a later date. “This approach proved successful in the first period of postrevolutionary state-building, but it also laid the foundation for future contentions over the legitimacy of the regime from within”. As the initial revolutionary moment passed, some Islamists who supported Khomeini’s vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran while he was alive would start to question the power of the state once he was gone.
With external and internal threats diminishing, the reign of terror would come to a close with a period moderation during the 1990s. Parts of the Islamist coalition that created the Islamic Republic would become increasingly frustrated at its ideological rigid vision of an authoritarian state. Division was brewing from within the Islamic Republic over the legacy of the revolution and the nature of the new regime. This division was only going to grow over time as Khomeini’s disciples would fight amongst themselves for power as the revolutionary regime would now enter a stage of transition.
Bazargan and his provisional government resigned in protest, and the brief rule of moderates after the revolution would come to an end. In the aftermath, revolutionaries loyal to Khomeini would seize control of the government and would begin a reign of terror. While these Islamists were divided among themselves into leftist, liberal, and conservative camps, they were united in their fear that the revolution would fail and the Islamic Republic would collapse. At this point, their main goal was simply to establish the new regime and would endorse the reign the terror as means to that end. The Islamists loyal to Khomeini began to further consolidate power by eliminating liberal, communist, and even moderate Islamist opposition to their dominance of power in Iran.
Then in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran sparking a bloody eight year long conflict. As a result, the prospect of Saddam Hussein taking over the country provided further glue for the Islamist coalition. Moreover, the government intensified its crackdown against all opposition under the banner of national security since the war was “not just to repel invaders but also to cleanse Iran of all secular tendencies”.
The regime rounded up political opponents executing many and throwing many more in prison. These opponents included members of Bazargan’s provisional government such as former deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir-Entezam who would be jailed indefinitely and former Minister of Health Kazem Sami who would later be killed (New York Times 1988, np). Thousands more would flee the country as the reign of terror would engulf Iran.
The purge of opposition to the regime left only Islamists loyal to Khomeini participating within the political system and in positions of power. When the first president of the Islamic Republic Abulhassan Banisadr started to exert independence from Khomeini, he was be branded as a threat to the Islamic republic. He too was swept up in the purges and was forced to flee the country in 1981 as Khomeini loyalists solidified their hold on power. This early precedent made it clear that the elected branches of the government would have to take a back seat to power of the Supreme Leader.
The purges would extend to nearly all aspects of Iranian society as the regime sought to secure its hold on power. In this effort, the regime would launch a process dubbed the Iranian Cultural Revolution to transform Iran’s academic environment. The universities had always been a hotbed of leftist activity, and they provided the last stronghold for opponents of the regime. During the course of the Iranian Cultural Revolution, professors would be purged from their positions and course materials would be rewritten to fall in line with Islamic principles. The end goal was to turn the universities into a loyal component of the Islamic movement, but it would also wreak havoc on Iran’s academia for years to come.
Groups such as the Marxist inspired People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO) began a campaign of bombings and assassinations in response to the government’s own violence. They killed many of the top figures in the regime especially during a devastating bombing that killed both President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. This new internal threat only caused the regime to intensify its reign of terror and confirmed Islamist fears that there was a constant threat to the revolution. In this chaotic situation, Khomeini’s previous statements of an open society free from force were quickly replaced by the political reality of an increasingly authoritarian regime.
At this early state, liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini were willing to overlook gross violations of human rights and the constitution. During the reign of terror, there was a high likelihood of being swept up in the purges if you criticized the regime’s actions. Moreover, real threats to the Islamic Republic existed in the form of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the MKO which in the mind of liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini temporarily justified violations of democratic principles. If the very existence of the Islamic Republic was in danger, then the goal of a truly democratic Iran could be deferred until the regime itself could be secured.
Even though certain Islamists temporarily ignored the violations and intrinsic contradictions of the constitution, the potential for conflict was simply deferred to a later date. “This approach proved successful in the first period of postrevolutionary state-building, but it also laid the foundation for future contentions over the legitimacy of the regime from within”. As the initial revolutionary moment passed, some Islamists who supported Khomeini’s vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran while he was alive would start to question the power of the state once he was gone.
With external and internal threats diminishing, the reign of terror would come to a close with a period moderation during the 1990s. Parts of the Islamist coalition that created the Islamic Republic would become increasingly frustrated at its ideological rigid vision of an authoritarian state. Division was brewing from within the Islamic Republic over the legacy of the revolution and the nature of the new regime. This division was only going to grow over time as Khomeini’s disciples would fight amongst themselves for power as the revolutionary regime would now enter a stage of transition.
Friday, September 3, 2010
Ayatollah Dastgheib Mosque Attacked
Here is the story:
Several sources report that clashes between plainclothes forces and students of Ayatollah Dastgheib were reported at Qoba mosque in Shiraz. As Ayatollah Dastgheib predicted, following the Qods Day rally, plainclothes forces were led to Qoba mosque. The people at Qoba mosque contacted the police and told them of the planned attack. The police declined to send forces to the potential clash scene and instead only set fences around the mosque.
The plainclothes forces, who reportedly number between 200 and 300, broke down the fences, broke the mosque door, and attacked Ayatollah Dastgheib’s students.
People who were inside the mosque were unable to leave, and since there was no access to medical supplies, they began to help the injured students by tending to their wounds with materials they had available.
The number of people injured in the attack is currently unknown. Ayatollah Datsgheib’s supporters living outside Shiraz have no other way of supporting him but to spread the news.
Qods Day Protests Largely Absent
With Government forces putting great pressure on Mehdi Karroubi, large scale protests against the regime like last year have laregly been missing. Here is one report:
Pro-government militiamen attacked the home of an Iranian opposition leader with homemade bombs and beat one of his bodyguards unconscious, an opposition website reported, in an apparent attempt to keep him from attending a key rally on Friday.
Mahdi Karroubi's guards had to fire gunshots in the air to clear crowds that broke down the door of his home on Thursday night after days of gatherings outside, said the Sahamnews website, which supports Iran's pro-reform movement.
The report said the attackers were members of the plainclothes Basij militia, which led the crackdown on protests that swept the country in response to allegations of fraud in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's June 2009 re-election. Karroubi was one of the pro-reform candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad.
The brazen assault on Karroubi's doorstep suggests the Basij and other government security forces have increasingly turned their attention to pinpoint intimidation of opposition leaders after crackdowns derailed street protests.
Karroubi has remained the most public dissenter — with his car being the target of pro-government mobs several times. But authorities also have directed pressure on Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi and former President Mohammad Khatami.
The opposition has not held any street demonstrations since February and canceled plans for a rally on the anniversary of the election.
Crowds also encircled Karroubi's residence for several hours Friday as Iranians filled Tehran's streets for the annual state-sponsored rally known as Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day.
The government uses the occasion as an anti-Israel outpouring and to show its support for the Palestinians. But last year, Karroubi and other opposition leaders marked the day by gathering tens of thousands of their own supporters into the streets, and violent clashes broke out with security forces.
Crowds of hard-line protesters have gathered at the gate of Karroubi's home for several days, apparently because they believed he would try to attend the rally again this year, though none of the opposition leaders has called for demonstrations.
Karroubi's son, Hossein, told The Associated Press Friday that dozens of hard-liners had targeted the leader's home for several hours on Friday but they later dispersed.
President Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, addressed the Tehran rally, saying Israel and its supporters are too weak to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. No violence was reported at the event. Israel, the United States and other nations believe Iran intends to develop atomic weapons under the cover of its civil nuclear power program. Iran denies that, saying its nuclear work is only for peaceful purposes.
The president also dismissed the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks held in Washington this week, saying "the fate of Palestine will be decided in Palestine and through resistance and not in Washington." Iran supports the Palestinian militant group Hamas.
Gatherings for Quds Day were also held in other cities around the country.
Karroubi, a cleric, and Mousavi were the two pro-reform candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad in 2009. Mousavi claims he won the election but that it was stolen from him through massive fraud.
On Friday, Mousavi condemned the attack on Karroubi's home, saying it proved the government's "enmity against Israel is an excuse" for attacking opposition figures. "Karroubi and figures like him and other freedom-seekers are the real enemies of authoritarians."
Yasser Khomeini, a grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, also visited Karroubi at his home to express concern about the attack, according to Sahamnews.
On Thursday, Tehran police chief Gen. Hossein Sajedinia told the semi-official Fars news agency that police forces would be deployed in several parts of Tehran to maintain security during the rallies. There were no reports Friday of any opposition gatherings.
Since the vote, authorities have detained thousands and tried scores on charges of fomenting postelection unrest. More than 80 of them were sentenced to prison terms from six months to 15 years. Ten were sentenced to death, and their cases are being appealed.
Pro-government militiamen attacked the home of an Iranian opposition leader with homemade bombs and beat one of his bodyguards unconscious, an opposition website reported, in an apparent attempt to keep him from attending a key rally on Friday.
Mahdi Karroubi's guards had to fire gunshots in the air to clear crowds that broke down the door of his home on Thursday night after days of gatherings outside, said the Sahamnews website, which supports Iran's pro-reform movement.
The report said the attackers were members of the plainclothes Basij militia, which led the crackdown on protests that swept the country in response to allegations of fraud in President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's June 2009 re-election. Karroubi was one of the pro-reform candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad.
The brazen assault on Karroubi's doorstep suggests the Basij and other government security forces have increasingly turned their attention to pinpoint intimidation of opposition leaders after crackdowns derailed street protests.
Karroubi has remained the most public dissenter — with his car being the target of pro-government mobs several times. But authorities also have directed pressure on Green Movement leader Mir Hossein Mousavi and former President Mohammad Khatami.
The opposition has not held any street demonstrations since February and canceled plans for a rally on the anniversary of the election.
Crowds also encircled Karroubi's residence for several hours Friday as Iranians filled Tehran's streets for the annual state-sponsored rally known as Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day.
The government uses the occasion as an anti-Israel outpouring and to show its support for the Palestinians. But last year, Karroubi and other opposition leaders marked the day by gathering tens of thousands of their own supporters into the streets, and violent clashes broke out with security forces.
Crowds of hard-line protesters have gathered at the gate of Karroubi's home for several days, apparently because they believed he would try to attend the rally again this year, though none of the opposition leaders has called for demonstrations.
Karroubi's son, Hossein, told The Associated Press Friday that dozens of hard-liners had targeted the leader's home for several hours on Friday but they later dispersed.
President Ahmadinejad, meanwhile, addressed the Tehran rally, saying Israel and its supporters are too weak to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. No violence was reported at the event. Israel, the United States and other nations believe Iran intends to develop atomic weapons under the cover of its civil nuclear power program. Iran denies that, saying its nuclear work is only for peaceful purposes.
The president also dismissed the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks held in Washington this week, saying "the fate of Palestine will be decided in Palestine and through resistance and not in Washington." Iran supports the Palestinian militant group Hamas.
Gatherings for Quds Day were also held in other cities around the country.
Karroubi, a cleric, and Mousavi were the two pro-reform candidates who ran against Ahmadinejad in 2009. Mousavi claims he won the election but that it was stolen from him through massive fraud.
On Friday, Mousavi condemned the attack on Karroubi's home, saying it proved the government's "enmity against Israel is an excuse" for attacking opposition figures. "Karroubi and figures like him and other freedom-seekers are the real enemies of authoritarians."
Yasser Khomeini, a grandson of the Islamic Republic's founder, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, also visited Karroubi at his home to express concern about the attack, according to Sahamnews.
On Thursday, Tehran police chief Gen. Hossein Sajedinia told the semi-official Fars news agency that police forces would be deployed in several parts of Tehran to maintain security during the rallies. There were no reports Friday of any opposition gatherings.
Since the vote, authorities have detained thousands and tried scores on charges of fomenting postelection unrest. More than 80 of them were sentenced to prison terms from six months to 15 years. Ten were sentenced to death, and their cases are being appealed.
Part 3: Theocracy and Democracy
There would also be a democratically elected parliament called the Majlis, a Prime Minister approved by the Majlis, and a popularly elected President. In addition, an elected Assembly of Experts made up of clerics would have the right to select the Supreme Leader. These institutions would make up the elected part of the government and were intended to represent the voice of the people in the new government.
Table 1.1 outlines specific rights and institutions included in the constitution as a compromise to liberal and leftist sentiments. I include the provision along with the article in the constitution where it is included. The provisions in the right column are specifically limited by Islam while the ones in the left column apply under all circumstances. Even though the constitution is progressive in many ways such as a section about the rights of women, it also specifies that those rights have to fall within the limits of Islam. At the same time, other provisions such as the abolishment of torture are supposed to apply under all circumstances.
An appointed 12 member group of clerics known as the Guardian Council would monitor the elected branches of government to make sure their activities fall within the guidelines of Islam. Also an unofficial Expediency Council would be appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve disputes between the elected parts of the government and their clerical supervisors. The Expediency Council would officially become part of the constitution as part of referendum held in 1989.
The most important difference in the new draft of the constitution was the position of Supreme Leader who would become the clerical Head of State. The Supreme Leader would supervise the direction of the state and would have the final say over all actions of the government. Among the clerics in the regime, he is the top guardian of the people until the eventual return of the 12th Imam. Even with this vast power, the Supreme Leader would still be appointed by the elected Assembly of Experts and they would theoretically have the ability to remove him from power. Khomeini would become the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic despite his earlier pledge to stay out of the new regime.
Table 1.2 outlines the parts of the constitution that endorse theocratic sentiments in particular the idea of Velayat-e Faqih. I again include the provision in the constitution along with the article where it is included. These provisions demonstrate the non-secular nature of the constitution along with the vast authority given to the Supreme Leader.
Under the new constitution, certain important state institutions would be directly elected by the people while others would be appointed. Figure 1.3 shows the different institutions in the Islamic Republic as well as their mode of selection. I have omitted the office of Prime Minister since it was eliminated following the 1989 constitutional revisions. The oval represents the voters who directly elect certain institutions that are represented in the rectangles. The rounded squares represent institutions that are appointed by other parts of the regime through the bent arrows. Thus even with Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution, all power directly or indirectly flows from the voters at least in theory. Appendix C further elaborates the duties of these institutions and who is currently in control of them.
The new constitution had something to please those who believed in the popular will and those who wanted a strong role for the clergy. Although this approach seemed to create a system destined for conflict, “the Assembly found these qualities the best means for concealing or reconciling their differences, and deferring the practical meaning of these articles for the future Majlis and judiciary”. At least initially, the constitution would create the big tent necessary to create the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Even with the prominent role of the clergy in the new constitution, there was still a significant role for the average citizen to participate in the government compared to the previous regime.
The intense consciousness of the need for popular participation and legitimization through the votes of the people, reflected in the constitution, drew the poorer and less-educated groups into the political process, which provides a sharp contrast to the conditions under the Pahlavi regime. Whatever doubts the people as a whole might have had about the new republic, they continued to participate in the political process, so that in effect it may argued that one of Khomeini’s achievements was to mobilize ordinary people into involvement with the state.
The constitution was put to a popular vote and passed with over 98% of the vote. However, the inclusion of Velayat-e Faqih meant that there were more boycotts and less participation than the referendum on the type of regime a few months earlier.
The compromises in the constitution might have seemed reasonable at the time, but the end result was a fundamentally flawed document. For some it represented a democratic compact with the people that enshrined the doctrine of popular will and ensured fundamental freedoms for all. Others viewed the constitution as giving a select few clerics a divine mandate to rule the people in any manner they see fit.
Although the constitution did specify rights for the people and the ability to elect representatives, it also had many unresolved issues with regards to the extent of clerical power. For example certain basic rights, such as the freedom of assembly, were ambiguous in the new constitution, “public gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam". Liberals saw this stipulation as a clear indication that the people have a right to assemble such as when Mousavi would invoke this section of the constitution 30 years later to justify protests against the regime, “in this same constitution, it clearly says that people are free to hold peaceful gatherings. If only this principle from our national covenant is enacted, be certain that no one in the ruling establishment will have the opportunity to misuse their power”.
Yet the stipulation that the assembly not be detrimental to Islam complicated things since it was not clear who would make that determination and under what circumstances. Those who believed in a more authoritarian view of the state argued that the jurists entrusted to be the guardian of the people had the right to make that determination. If the ruling clerics say that a protest was against Islam, then it is not allowed since they are the final arbiter of state policy. Thus the compromises in the constitution created a path to democracy or dictatorship depending on the political belief on those in power.
Table 1.1 outlines specific rights and institutions included in the constitution as a compromise to liberal and leftist sentiments. I include the provision along with the article in the constitution where it is included. The provisions in the right column are specifically limited by Islam while the ones in the left column apply under all circumstances. Even though the constitution is progressive in many ways such as a section about the rights of women, it also specifies that those rights have to fall within the limits of Islam. At the same time, other provisions such as the abolishment of torture are supposed to apply under all circumstances.
Table 1.1 Compromises to liberal and leftist sentiments in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
| Provision Applying in all Circumstances | Article in Constitution | Provision Limited by Islam | Article in Constitution |
| Protection of Non-Muslims | 13, 14 | Women’s Rights | 21 |
| No State Discrimination | 19 | Freedom of Press | 24 |
| Equality Before the Law | 20 | Freedom of Association | 26 |
| Freedom of Belief | 23 | Freedom of Assembly | 27 |
| Privacy of Communication | 25 | Right to Work | 28 |
| Right to Welfare Benefits | 29 | Elected Legislature | 58, 62 |
| Right to Education | 30 | Elected President | 60, 113, 114 |
| Right to Housing | 31 |
| |
| Rights of Arrested | 32, 39 |
| |
| Right to Recourse in Courts | 34 |
| |
| Right to Council | 35 |
| |
| Presumption of Innocence | 37 |
| |
| Torture Outlawed | 38 |
| |
| Respect of Private Property | 47 |
| |
| Public Trials | 165 |
| |
| Reasonable Punishments | 166 |
| |
An appointed 12 member group of clerics known as the Guardian Council would monitor the elected branches of government to make sure their activities fall within the guidelines of Islam. Also an unofficial Expediency Council would be appointed by the Supreme Leader to resolve disputes between the elected parts of the government and their clerical supervisors. The Expediency Council would officially become part of the constitution as part of referendum held in 1989.
The most important difference in the new draft of the constitution was the position of Supreme Leader who would become the clerical Head of State. The Supreme Leader would supervise the direction of the state and would have the final say over all actions of the government. Among the clerics in the regime, he is the top guardian of the people until the eventual return of the 12th Imam. Even with this vast power, the Supreme Leader would still be appointed by the elected Assembly of Experts and they would theoretically have the ability to remove him from power. Khomeini would become the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic despite his earlier pledge to stay out of the new regime.
Table 1.2 outlines the parts of the constitution that endorse theocratic sentiments in particular the idea of Velayat-e Faqih. I again include the provision in the constitution along with the article where it is included. These provisions demonstrate the non-secular nature of the constitution along with the vast authority given to the Supreme Leader.
Table 1.2 Compromises to theocratic sentiments in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran
| Provision | Article of Constitution |
| State Policy Must Fall within Islamic Criteria | 4 |
| Right of Supreme Leader to Rule in Absence of 12th Imam | 5 |
| Shii Islam Official State Religion | 12 |
| Ultimate Sovereignty Belongs to God | 56 |
| Clerical Guardian Council Can Veto Laws | 91 |
| Supreme Leader as Head of State, Commander-in-Chief, and Final Arbiter of State Policy | 107, 110 |
| Judiciary Appointed by Supreme Leader | 110, 157 |
Under the new constitution, certain important state institutions would be directly elected by the people while others would be appointed. Figure 1.3 shows the different institutions in the Islamic Republic as well as their mode of selection. I have omitted the office of Prime Minister since it was eliminated following the 1989 constitutional revisions. The oval represents the voters who directly elect certain institutions that are represented in the rectangles. The rounded squares represent institutions that are appointed by other parts of the regime through the bent arrows. Thus even with Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution, all power directly or indirectly flows from the voters at least in theory. Appendix C further elaborates the duties of these institutions and who is currently in control of them.
Figure 1.3 Key institutions and their mode of selection in the Islamic Republic of Iran
The new constitution had something to please those who believed in the popular will and those who wanted a strong role for the clergy. Although this approach seemed to create a system destined for conflict, “the Assembly found these qualities the best means for concealing or reconciling their differences, and deferring the practical meaning of these articles for the future Majlis and judiciary”. At least initially, the constitution would create the big tent necessary to create the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Even with the prominent role of the clergy in the new constitution, there was still a significant role for the average citizen to participate in the government compared to the previous regime.
The intense consciousness of the need for popular participation and legitimization through the votes of the people, reflected in the constitution, drew the poorer and less-educated groups into the political process, which provides a sharp contrast to the conditions under the Pahlavi regime. Whatever doubts the people as a whole might have had about the new republic, they continued to participate in the political process, so that in effect it may argued that one of Khomeini’s achievements was to mobilize ordinary people into involvement with the state.
The constitution was put to a popular vote and passed with over 98% of the vote. However, the inclusion of Velayat-e Faqih meant that there were more boycotts and less participation than the referendum on the type of regime a few months earlier.
The compromises in the constitution might have seemed reasonable at the time, but the end result was a fundamentally flawed document. For some it represented a democratic compact with the people that enshrined the doctrine of popular will and ensured fundamental freedoms for all. Others viewed the constitution as giving a select few clerics a divine mandate to rule the people in any manner they see fit.
Although the constitution did specify rights for the people and the ability to elect representatives, it also had many unresolved issues with regards to the extent of clerical power. For example certain basic rights, such as the freedom of assembly, were ambiguous in the new constitution, “public gatherings and marches may be freely held, provided arms are not carried and that they are not detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam". Liberals saw this stipulation as a clear indication that the people have a right to assemble such as when Mousavi would invoke this section of the constitution 30 years later to justify protests against the regime, “in this same constitution, it clearly says that people are free to hold peaceful gatherings. If only this principle from our national covenant is enacted, be certain that no one in the ruling establishment will have the opportunity to misuse their power”.
Yet the stipulation that the assembly not be detrimental to Islam complicated things since it was not clear who would make that determination and under what circumstances. Those who believed in a more authoritarian view of the state argued that the jurists entrusted to be the guardian of the people had the right to make that determination. If the ruling clerics say that a protest was against Islam, then it is not allowed since they are the final arbiter of state policy. Thus the compromises in the constitution created a path to democracy or dictatorship depending on the political belief on those in power.
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