Thursday, September 9, 2010

Part 8: Challenging Velayat-e Faqih

Some of the most daring assaults on the regime came from clerics who challenged the theological foundations of the state especially Khomeini’s vision of Velayat-e Faqih. These intellectual clerics included Yousefi Eshkevari, Mohsen Kadivar, Abdollah Nouri, and others who supported a democratic version of Islam. They argued that the idea of unlimited power in the hands of one man was not only wrong, but it was actually against the basic tenets of Shii Islam.

Mohsen Kadivar was a cleric and a disciple of Montazeri who delved into the theolotical foundations of Velayat-e Faqih. He argued that Velayat-e Faqih had no precedent in Shii Islam and was not consistent with the teachings of the faith. Kadviar’s arguments would be expounded upon by other clerics who said it was blasphemy for anyone to claim to rule in the manner of the 12th Imam.

Even though the clerics had knowledge about Islam, they were not the Imams and thus were basically the same as everyone else. Since they were fallible like everyone else, it does not make sense for them to have absolute power such as in the authoritarianism of Velayat-e Faqih. Kadivar argues that “there is no blueprint for the management of the society during the time of occultation. No one has a special mission or authority to guide the society”.

Instead, the reformists presented a vision of Shii Islam that highlighted the democratic principles of the religion. They argued that the idea of justice and opposition to tyranny was critical in Shii Islam going back to the martyrdom of the third Imam Hossein. According to this vision, Hossein and the other Imams dedicated their lives to trying to build a just society in the face of the tyrants of their day.

This version of Shii Islam had been developed before the 1979 revolution by Ali Shariati and other Islamic intellectuals, but reformists would argue that the current Islamic Republic did not reflect these principles. As Khatami would say, “long-lasting tyranny is our chronic pain, and the cure for this chronic pain is the rule of the people. We demand freedom”.

The reformists believed that the only type of government that would be compatible with Shii Islam is democracy. Since Shii Islam opposes tyranny and seeks justice, a democratic government ensures that tyranny cannot take hold and gives justice for all. Elected institutions make sure no one becomes a tyrant and makes everyone equal under God. In essence, the reformists were arguing for a guardianship of the state until the return of the 12th Imam as opposed to a Guardianship of the Jurist. Grand-Ayatollah Montazeri endorsed the reformists’ vision for the state and supported opposition to the regime, “I believe that Islam and democracy can coexist because Islam supports freedom. What the conservative leaders are practicing today is not Islam and I oppose it”.

Clearly the reformists’ critique of Velayat-e Faqih was particularly dangerous to a regime because it came from clerics and made strong Islamic arguments against the current manifestation of the Islamic Republic. The reform movement was beginning to look like an Islamic movement advocating a vision of Islam parallel to the official regime version. It hit the regime at its very source of legitimacy and threatened to take the regime’s base of pious Iranians. As the reform movement gained strength, it would crackdown by throwing Kadivar, Eshkevari, Nouri, and other reformists in prison.

Perhaps the most provocative critique of the regime came from an intellectual who initially led the university purges in the early days of the revolution. Abdolkarim Soroush was one of the leading Islamic intellectuals at the beginning of the revolution and was tapped by the regime to help transform the troublesome universities. In the Iranian Cultural Revolution, Soroush played a key role in purging the universities of Western influence even while facing tremendous backlashes from professors and students.

Ironically once Soroush himself retreated into academia, his pursuit of philosophy and religious studies led to become one of the regime’s fiercest critics. Where reformist clerics argued that Shii Islam mandates a democratic form of government, Soroush took the next step and argued that Islam could mean whatever a society wanted it to mean. “In contrast to revivalists’ Islamic ideology, which interprets the finality of Islam as a sign of its exhaustive rigidity, Soroush contended that Islam’s finality signifies its indeterminate fluidity. The finality of Islam means that every generation experiences revelation anew”.

Soroush was making an argument that applied not to Islam, but a broader observation on all the world’s religions. He viewed religion as something that was constantly changing depending on the historical context. In this theological reality, the best government should be implemented as opposed to a government that religion supposedly mandates. Souroush would advocate democratic government as the best for Iran in the absence of any religiously mandated form of government.

Regardless of how they got to the conclusion, the various reformists all agreed that democracy and an open society was what Iran needed. It was also clear that the current regime was not dedicated to achieving this goal. Given this reality, the reformists would have to figure out how to achieve their desired Iran.

They believed that the democratic components of the constitution were a good starting point and a base from which to build the free society they envisioned. At the same time, the constitution and its elected branches of government allowed a way through which the reformists could reach their goals. Thus the reformists were not advocating an overthrow of the Islamic Republic, but rather a gradual shift in its policies through existing state mechanisms.

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