Saturday, September 4, 2010

Part 4: The Revolution Falls Apart

The constitution was immediately put to the test as conflict between the different political factions was spiraling towards violence. Islamists loyal to Khomeini became alarmed at Bazargan’s attempts to repair relations with the United States since they believed America was plotting to undermine the revolution. They believed that the American embassy in particular was a “Nest of Spies” and on November, 4 1979 a group of revolutionary students would seize the embassy and a number of its employees. Bazargan demanded that Khomeini force the students to release the employees, but Khomeini refused setting off the Iranian hostage crisis.

Bazargan and his provisional government resigned in protest, and the brief rule of moderates after the revolution would come to an end. In the aftermath, revolutionaries loyal to Khomeini would seize control of the government and would begin a reign of terror. While these Islamists were divided among themselves into leftist, liberal, and conservative camps, they were united in their fear that the revolution would fail and the Islamic Republic would collapse. At this point, their main goal was simply to establish the new regime and would endorse the reign the terror as means to that end. The Islamists loyal to Khomeini began to further consolidate power by eliminating liberal, communist, and even moderate Islamist opposition to their dominance of power in Iran.

Then in September 1980, Iraq invaded Iran sparking a bloody eight year long conflict. As a result, the prospect of Saddam Hussein taking over the country provided further glue for the Islamist coalition. Moreover, the government intensified its crackdown against all opposition under the banner of national security since the war was “not just to repel invaders but also to cleanse Iran of all secular tendencies”.

The regime rounded up political opponents executing many and throwing many more in prison. These opponents included members of Bazargan’s provisional government such as former deputy Prime Minister Abbas Amir-Entezam who would be jailed indefinitely and former Minister of Health Kazem Sami who would later be killed (New York Times 1988, np). Thousands more would flee the country as the reign of terror would engulf Iran.

The purge of opposition to the regime left only Islamists loyal to Khomeini participating within the political system and in positions of power. When the first president of the Islamic Republic Abulhassan Banisadr started to exert independence from Khomeini, he was be branded as a threat to the Islamic republic. He too was swept up in the purges and was forced to flee the country in 1981 as Khomeini loyalists solidified their hold on power. This early precedent made it clear that the elected branches of the government would have to take a back seat to power of the Supreme Leader.

The purges would extend to nearly all aspects of Iranian society as the regime sought to secure its hold on power. In this effort, the regime would launch a process dubbed the Iranian Cultural Revolution to transform Iran’s academic environment. The universities had always been a hotbed of leftist activity, and they provided the last stronghold for opponents of the regime. During the course of the Iranian Cultural Revolution, professors would be purged from their positions and course materials would be rewritten to fall in line with Islamic principles. The end goal was to turn the universities into a loyal component of the Islamic movement, but it would also wreak havoc on Iran’s academia for years to come.

Groups such as the Marxist inspired People's Mujahedin of Iran (MKO) began a campaign of bombings and assassinations in response to the government’s own violence. They killed many of the top figures in the regime especially during a devastating bombing that killed both President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. This new internal threat only caused the regime to intensify its reign of terror and confirmed Islamist fears that there was a constant threat to the revolution. In this chaotic situation, Khomeini’s previous statements of an open society free from force were quickly replaced by the political reality of an increasingly authoritarian regime.

At this early state, liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini were willing to overlook gross violations of human rights and the constitution. During the reign of terror, there was a high likelihood of being swept up in the purges if you criticized the regime’s actions. Moreover, real threats to the Islamic Republic existed in the form of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and the MKO which in the mind of liberal Islamists loyal to Khomeini temporarily justified violations of democratic principles. If the very existence of the Islamic Republic was in danger, then the goal of a truly democratic Iran could be deferred until the regime itself could be secured.

Even though certain Islamists temporarily ignored the violations and intrinsic contradictions of the constitution, the potential for conflict was simply deferred to a later date. “This approach proved successful in the first period of postrevolutionary state-building, but it also laid the foundation for future contentions over the legitimacy of the regime from within”. As the initial revolutionary moment passed, some Islamists who supported Khomeini’s vision for the Islamic Republic of Iran while he was alive would start to question the power of the state once he was gone.

With external and internal threats diminishing, the reign of terror would come to a close with a period moderation during the 1990s. Parts of the Islamist coalition that created the Islamic Republic would become increasingly frustrated at its ideological rigid vision of an authoritarian state. Division was brewing from within the Islamic Republic over the legacy of the revolution and the nature of the new regime. This division was only going to grow over time as Khomeini’s disciples would fight amongst themselves for power as the revolutionary regime would now enter a stage of transition.

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