Part 5: Khomeini's Followers Begin to Split

The end of the Iran-Iraq war in August 1988 and the death of Supreme Leader Khomeini in June 1989 marked the end of an era for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the one year period between August 1988 and August 1989, these two events and a series of other major changes led to a period of transition for the regime. The pillars that maintained the initial revolutionary moment in Iran were gone and the Islamic Republic would have to adapt to a new order. Those who now were in charge of the country in the wake of these changes would begin a process of normalization to maintain the Islamic Republic in this new environment.

In the wake of this transition, the reign of terror in Iran would finally come to an end and a period of moderation would take place for roughly the next decade. What Brinton calls the thermidor period occurs in all post-revolutionary societies when the initial zeal for the revolution wanes within the regime and the overall population. “This tends to occur shortly after the death or ousting of the charismatic figure, though signs can often be seen during the leader's reign”.

In the Iranian case, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the death of the revolution’s charismatic leader Khomeini meant that the thermidor would begin in the Islamic Republic around 1989. In this period of moderation, the regime allowed greater political freedoms leading to the creation of a vibrant civil society in Iran. This environment allowed liberal Islamist intellectuals to question the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and even the concept of the Islamic Republic.

As the reign of terror ended in Iran and a moderate political environment developed, the coalition of Islamists forged to create the Islamic Republic would begin to collapse. Khomeini’s disciples disagreed over the fundamental nature of the regime and fiercely competed for power in the years to come. In this competition, some of the most loyal followers of Khomeini started to question the very foundations of the Islamic Republic. Ultimately, these liberal Islamists would join together to create the reform movement aimed at transforming the regime from within.

At the same time, those who wanted to maintain a more authoritarian regime would initially have the upper hand in this transition period. While they had to allow limited liberalization, conservatives in the regime were still able to keep a tight control on power. This dominance was challenged in the late 1990s as reformists would triumph at the ballot box in three straight elections. In response, the thermidor period would come to an end and conservatives would take steps to reassert their control of the regime.

Even before Khomeini’s death, internal conflict had started within the different Islamist factions of the regime. The most prominent manifestation of this conflict was between then President Ali Khamenei and then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi. The two would clash repeatedly over various state policies making governing difficult in the Islamic Republic.
At this early stage, it was becoming apparent that two different camps were emerging within the regime embodied in the rivalry between the two men. Due to his tremendous standing, Khomeini was the final arbiter of all conflicts and would often side with Mousavi over Khamenei. Even though Khomeini attempted to balance the different factions of the regime against each other, division was brewing within the regime and it would only grow after his death.

Mousavi and his faction of the regime represented the leftist and liberal elements within the Islamic movement who wanted greater revolutionary change. They “advocated the cause of the poor, believed in the export of the revolution, maintained a more tolerant view on sociocultural policies, and supported state-sponsored redistributive and egalitarian policies”. Given their desire for a more substantive economic and social change after the revolution, they were dubbed “the radicals” by those who were weary of their intentions in transforming Iran.

However, they made up a significant portion of the Islamist movement within the regime and had strong backing among both the intellectuals and lower classes in the country. Mousavi was appointed Prime Minister to appease this faction within the regime and would serve for eight years managing the nation during the war with Iraq. Over time these radicals began to shift their attention to the authoritarian nature of the regime since they believed in represented an abandonment of the original revolutionary ideas.

Khamenei and the conservative faction of the regime represented a coalition between those who believed in free market economics and a more authoritarian view on government. They did not believe there was a major economic component to the revolution and were against redistribution of wealth to the masses. The conservatives were also weary of the public participation in the governing process and argued for greater clerical control of the government through Velayat-e Faqih. “This faction enjoyed the backing of the traditional Iranian bourgeoisie, the merchants of the bazaar, as well as the ultra-orthodox clergy and the highly religious segments of Iranian society”.

Khamenei and the other conservatives within the regime had to compete with Mousavi as Prime Minister and a significant block of radicals in the Majlis for Khomeini’s favor. Even with their significant differences, the continued internal threat posed by the MKO and the external threat of Iraq caused these two factions to cooperate in order to maintain the Islamic Republic. As the 1980s wore on and the threat to the regime diminished, early cracks in the coalition were already becoming visible.

One of the first major signs of the of the internal conflict was the dissolution of the Islamic Republican Party established in 1979 as an umbrella organization for Islamists loyal to Khomeini. By 1987, the different factions within the regime meant that it could no longer operate coherently as the official political party of the Islamist coalition. It became obvious that new political parties would have to emerge in order to represent the increasingly diverse views within the regime.

Khameini and Speaker of the Majlis Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani sent a letter to Khomeini requesting that the Islamic Republican Party be split up. Khomeini gave his approval and the dominant political party in Iran which had helped to create and maintain the Islamic Republic no longer existed. In the coming years, it would be replaced with numerous other political parties each with its own unique vision for the Islamic Republic causing further division within the regime.

The next group to fracture within the regime was the Society of Militant Clergy (SMC) which had been created before the revolution in 1977. It was made up of clerics loyal to Khomeini and who rejected the complacent attitude of others clerics who did not actively oppose the Shah. The divisions apparent in other parts of the regime were also evident in the clergy, and a new clerical organization would be born more aligned with the radicals.

A group of clerics who would later become leading figures in the reform movement including future president Mohammad Khatami and future speaker of the Majlis Mehdi Karroubi sent an open letter to Khomeini in 1988 requesting the creation of a new clerical organization.

They reiterated their concern that a split in the SMC might appear a sign of ‘trouble for the revolution.’ They assured the Supreme Leader that they have considered ‘all possible compromises with other respected ruhaniyun [clergy].’ ‘But,’ the letter explained… ‘we have decided to form a new association in the service of the Islamic revolution.’ They called the new organization Majma’-e Ruhaniyun-e Mobarez, or the Association of Militant Clerics (AMC).