Part 7: The Birth of the Reform Movement

The radicals would go head to head with the conservatives at the ballot box during the 1992 Majlis elections. Although fully fledged political parties had not yet developed, two blocs emerged for the Majlis election. One group was closely aligned to Rafsanjani and his policies of economic liberalization. They also had the support of Khamenei and supported his authoritarian political views. The other groups consisted of the radicals who wanted greater state intervention in the economy and believed in a more open society.

In the Iranian electoral system, candidates must be approved by the Guardian Council in order to run in elections. Behind the scenes, Khamenei and the regime threw the regime’s support behind the conservative bloc and actively worked to get these candidates elected. 2000 candidates were approved for the parliamentary elections, but the radicals complained that nearly 1000 of their candidates were not allowed to run. In a tactic perfected in years to come, the regime began to manipulate elections even while still holding them thereby maintaining a façade of democracy.

Yet the fact that elections even took place and some opposition candidates were allowed to stand for election and be elected shows that Iran at this point was not a classic authoritarian state. Despite Khamenei and the conservative bloc’s absolutist pretensions, as well as their manipulation of the Islamic Republic’s processes, Iran did not become a typical totalitarian state such as Saddam’s Iraq. The constitutional structure that still invested some power in elected bodies ensure the Iranian people and their representatives would have a voice in the state’s deliberations. This period of moderation with somewhat competitive elections would not last forever as Iran was slowly drifting towards authoritarianism.

The 1992 parliamentary elections was a disaster for the radicals as the conservative bloc swept the elections. While the radicals would claim that the regime’s intervention spelled their defeat, the reality was that their views were unpopular with the public (Moslem 2002, 181). Rafsanjani promised to rebuild the Iranian economy in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war by unleashing the power of the market. The radicals simply repackaged old ideas of a state controlled economy when the population wanted to enjoy the prospect of capitalist materialism after of years rationing and scarcity during the war.

Perhaps most importantly, the 1992 parliamentary elections sent the radicals further into the political wilderness emerging eventually as the reform movement. “The 1992 election debacle proved to be a watershed event, as many of the disqualified candidates retreated into private order to reevaluate their dogma and identity”. The elections may not have changed the regime as the radical had hoped, but it changed the radicals leading to future electoral success as the reform movement.

It is important to note that the regime’s opposition was still willing to work within the confines of the regime even though they believed the conservatives influenced the electoral results. Instead of becoming an outside protest movement in the Islamic Republic, the opposition focused on its message and prepared for the next round of elections. This strategy of changing the regime through elections was only viable if the opposition believed it could win future elections. Once it became clear in 2009 that it was impossible for the opposition to win elections, then there no longer would be incentive to remain within the regime.

Although Rafsanjani largely endorsed Khamenei’s authoritarian view of the state, he was much more of a pragmatist than the Supreme Leader. He realized that people would need greater political rights in order to achieve better economic results. Greater freedom and choice in the economic realm would mean that people would expect similar rights when it came to politics. Moreover if there was less political tension within the country, the population could devout more of its energy to achieving the best possible economic results.

To that end, Rafsanjani appointed as Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance a cleric named Muhammad Khatami who started to slowly implement political liberalization. Khatami’s ministry had discretion over the amount of government censorship and also the amount of freedom the media could enjoy. Khatami held a more democratic vision of Islam and believed that the revolution had been fought to secure basic rights stating, “freedom of thought and respect for intellectual honor are among the prime goals of the revolution”.

While Khatami had a limit to the amount of freedom he could grant, the regime certainly did become more open to debate and increased political speech during this time. For example, the regime allowed more journals and newspapers to exist with the number increasing from 102 in 1988 to 370 in 1992. This political opening gave Islamists who opposed the authoritarian policies of the regime greater flexibility to publically discuss and debate their beliefs. The relatively open political environment created the conditions for intellectual and academic debate which would be critical for the creation of the reform movement.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war also had a significant influence on the development of the reform movement. While the 1992 electoral debacle made the opposition reflect on their own failures, the Iran-Iraq war made them think about the regime’s failures. The war had cost Iran nearly one million causalities and drained the nation’s coffers and resources. The end result was the pre-war status quo and a failure to export the revolution to Shii majority Iraq. This caused many of the most steadfast Islamic supporters of the revolution to question the regime’s actions and the direction it was taking.

One of the most important objectives of the revolution was to remove foreign influence from Iran since it was believed that it was the cause of many of the country’s fundamental problems. Yet with the removal of foreign elements complete, Iran still had many of the problems that it faced during foreign intervention in the country. While some reverted to blaming traditional foreign imperialists for these failures, a group of intellectuals began to look within for the source of Iran’s problems.

The end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1989 inaugurated a moment of self-reflection among emerging intellectuals who no longer sought to identify the roots of Iranian political, social, and economic problems in its colonial history. For many, the time had come to put internal dynamics rather than external interventions, at the center of the debate over the predicament of modernity and social change in Iran.

As a result, the reform movement was born out of an intellectual revolution among Islamists who began to question the direction of the Islamic Republic. Reflecting on the authoritarian drift of the regime and their own place within the system, the former radicals began to rethink the original purpose of the revolution. They started to view the revolution not just as a struggle to once again make Iran Islamic, but rather as a social justice movement meant to ensure equality and freedom for the Iranian people. In other words Islam was not an end in itself, but it was supposed to be the means that would create the end of a free and just society. The realization that the current regime did not live up to these ideals meant that the reformists would delve into the foundations of the Islamic Republic and more deeply into the very meaning of Islam.